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I examine the role of federal loans on access to higher education and student welfare by
modeling students’ postsecondary investments in human capital. I develop a dynamic discrete
choice model of a student’s decision to apply to college, to enroll in a college in which she is
admitted, and to finance education, either by borrowing or working, in the presence of borrowing
constraints. I estimate the structural parameters of this forward-looking decision process using
data from two cohorts of students who enter college before and after a rare increase to federal
loan limits in 2007 and 2008. Analysis of counterfactual policies shows that raising loan limits
increases enrollment, specifically towards four-year non-elite colleges, and improves persistence of
enrollment. While providing free non-elite college encourages enrollment, sorting to community
colleges and four-year colleges by income may not reduce existing gaps in the quality of college
attended. Welfare gains are concentrated among high-ability students, who benefit from relaxed
credit constraints across the income distribution. Relative to free college, increasing borrowing
limits provides 50 percent of the average welfare gains and more than 94 percent of the welfare
gains for high-ability students at a fraction of the policy cost. However, accounting for supply side
college pricing responses reduces welfare gains non-trivially, specifically for low-income students.
I supplement this analysis with a model of college admission and pricing decisions. Heteroge-
neous colleges try to attract a high-achieving student population and generate revenue while facing
capacity constraints. Expansion in loans relax financial constraints and make expensive colleges
more affordable, but colleges may increase tuition because they anticipate that students can borrow
to pay higher tuition. I then provide a strategy to estimate the structural parameters of colleges’
decision-making, which can be used to better evaluate hypothetical subsidies on student welfare.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Although college enrollment rates in the United States increased from 2000 to 2014, an
enrollment gap by economic background persists: 65 percent of low-income students enrolled in
college in 2014, compared to 83 percent of high-income students.1 We observe further inequality
along the intensive margin of the quality of colleges students attend. Enrollment rates at four-year
institutions increased only for high-income students, while enrollment rates at two-year and for-profit
institutions increased for all other students. As the cost of college attendance has simultaneously
increased by 14 to 46 percent,2 financial constraints have become a greater barrier to college access
for recent student cohorts.
Federal financial aid policies aim to relax these financial constraints. While several studies
show that price reductions (grants, scholarships, and tax credits) increase enrollment, we know
surprisingly less about the effects of federal student loans. In comparison to price reductions, loans
present unique economic mechanisms with different welfare implications, and represent the largest
source of financial aid for undergraduates, ranging between 34 to 42 percent of total aid volume.3
Federal loans also address a market inefficiency in human capital financing: a lack of collateral
reduces access to private credit, resulting in sub-optimal levels of human capital accumulation
(Friedman, 1955). Students still face financial frictions as the government sets borrowing limits
1These rates measure college enrollment among recent high school graduates or equivalent in 2014 (Snyder
et al., 2019). In 2000, 50 percent of low-income students (in the bottom household income quintile) and 77
percent of high-income students (in top quintile) enrolled in college.
2Cost of attendance includes tuition, fees, room, board, and additional materials such as books and supplies.
From 2000 to 2014, the enrollment-weighted average cost (in 2016 dollars) for an in-state student to attend
a four-year public college increased from $13,653 to $19,969 ($22,312 to $32,546 for out-of-state students).
Four-year private college cost of attendance increased from $31,979 to $43,918.
3From 2000 to 2014, federal loans, institutional grants, and federal grants were, respectively, the three largest
sources of total undergraduate aid by volume (Baum et al., 2019).
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that determine students’ access to loans. Limited variation in these policies have made it difficult
to understand the empirical role of credit constraints in human capital investments. Therefore, I
examine how federal loans impact students’ postsecondary investments in human capital and the
resulting student welfare.
The popular discussion on federal loans highlights a potential student debt crisis and focuses
on student welfare after college, measured by labor market outcomes, consumption, and debt
repayment.4 However, federal policies determine the supply of loans and affect a student’s welfare
from the moment she leaves high school. Availability of loans impacts her enrollment and choice
of college (that build human capital) and her annual borrowing decisions (that accumulate student
debt). Similar to price reductions, economic intuition suggests that greater access to loans should
increase a student’s demand for postsecondary investments in human capital: she may attend college,
she may choose a better and more expensive college, and she may borrow more.
The use of loans to finance higher education differs from other common education subsidies in
two key dimensions. First, borrowing presents an endogenous decision while other types of price
reductions generally do not. A model that includes student loans must consider that the student
faces a trade-off between future wage gains from enrollment at a better college and repayment of
accumulated student debt. Furthermore, as the student is responsible for her debt regardless of
her education outcomes, borrowed funds to pay for education will have more persistent effects on
continued college enrollment than price reductions. Second, expansion of federal loans affects a
larger student population. In theory, any eligible student can borrow from the government, while
grants and other scholarships often target low-income students. Thus, there may be distributional
effects unique to loan policies.
Based on the current federal financial aid environment, I develop a dynamic discrete choice
model of a student’s decision-making with regard to college enrollment, college type, and college
financing in the presence of borrowing constraints. Specifically, a student applies to college, chooses
4Increased loan availability generally leads to greater student debt and higher earnings after college (Black
et al., 2020). However, high levels of debt can constrain career choices (Rothstein and Rouse, 2011), delay
marriage (Sieg and Wang, 2018), and have small negative effects on homeownership (Mezza et al., 2020).
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to enroll in a college from among her admissions, and (if matriculating) annually decides to borrow
and work part-time in order to pay for college. She takes college prices (e.g., tuition and other
college expenses) and government policies as given and evaluates, relative to the outside option of
entering the labor market without further education, her alternatives based on expected earnings and
non-pecuniary benefits of college completion from the specific institution, as well as the price of
attendance and loan repayment. Furthermore, she receives shocks related to admissions, aid, and
federally determined financial need that define her college choice set and her individual price of
attending a particular college.
I estimate the structural parameters of this forward-looking discrete choice model using detailed
information on student behaviors after high school from two nationally representative cohorts of
high school students who enter college before and after an increase to federal borrowing limits in
2007 and 2008, the first such change since 1994. The data include information regarding student
demographics, college applications, enrollment, student loan borrowing, and labor market outcomes.
I supplement the student-level data with annual information on tuition rates and institutional aid for
all colleges that participate in federal financial aid programs. I use the variation in loan environment
that each cohort faces to identify the structural parameters that determine shifts in borrowing
behavior and the distribution of enrollment across different institutions.
This paper offers a comparison of alternative education subsidies for their effects on student
welfare. A structural model allows me to analyze various counterfactual policies and model their
heterogeneous effects across the distribution of students. Specifically, I examine the policy changes
in 2007 and 2008, further increases to federal borrowing limits, expansion of federal Pell grants,
and proposals to subsidize public colleges. I also consider loan policies while acknowledging that
colleges respond to expansion in federal financial aid by increasing tuition. I account for such
pass-through in my welfare analysis by using existing estimates from the literature. Therefore, the
model can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of various education subsidies at improving access
to higher education and also to identify which students benefit most from each subsidy.
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Policy analysis shows that relaxing credit constraints, through federal loan expansion, alters
the student’s enrollment decision. Specifically, a $4,000 increase in loan limits leads to a 4.2
percentage point (pp) increase in overall enrollment, with enrollment shifting towards four-year
non-elite institutions. Furthermore, higher loan limits lead to greater persistence as shown by higher
levels of enrollment in the second through fourth years of college. Expanding targeted education
subsidies using federal Pell grants leads to greater community college5 enrollment, with low-income
students exhibiting the largest shifts in enrollment. Providing a free in-state non-elite public college
education shows enrollment gains similar to that of increasing loan limits, but also results in sorting
of students between community college and four-year colleges by income. Therefore, free public
college may not reduce gaps in the quality of colleges attended by students.
Welfare gains are concentrated among high ability students for all policies. Moreover, while the
free public college option improves average student welfare the most, relaxing credit constraints is a
cost effective policy to improve student welfare. Relative to free college, increasing borrowing limits
provides 50 percent of the average welfare gains and more than 94 percent of the welfare gains for
high ability students at a fraction of the policy cost. Accounting for pass-through of federal loans to
tuition reduces average welfare gains by 20 percent and reduces low- and middle-income students’
welfare gains by up to 30 percent. However, increasing loan limits are unique from other policies as
the resulting welfare gains for high ability students are similar across the income distribution.
In addition to the policy contribution, this research adds to a growing literature on the presence
and relevance of credit constraints in students’ postsecondary education decisions in order to better
understand enrollment gaps by family income. Specifically, I am able to use data from more
recent student cohorts exposed to federal policy changes in 2007 and 2008 to quantify the role of
credit constraints in postsecondary human capital investments. Previous studies that document the
enrollment effects of reduced college costs mainly consider financial aid mechanisms that subsidize
5I use the terms “two-year”, “less than four-year”, and “community college” interchangeably.
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tuition without a need for repayment, such as scholarships, grants, and education tax credits.6 These
forms of aid relax a student’s and her family’s budget constraints by explicitly lowering the price of
attendance. Access to loans further relaxes the student’s credit constraints. The economics literature
has debated whether such credit constraints exist.7 However, research on younger cohorts shows
that credit constraints, such as federal loan limits, currently bind more often than in the 1980s
(Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011; Johnson, 2013; Hai and Heckman, 2017). Due to consistent
tuition growth coupled with stable federal borrowing limits, more students face binding borrowing
constraints, which result in persistent enrollment disparities by family income and wealth even after
conditioning for student ability.
Furthermore, this paper is among few to consider several important margins of student response
to loan policies beyond enrollment, including college choice, part-time labor during college, and
annual decisions to continue enrollment or drop out. Although credit constraints are more prevalent
among recent cohorts, analyses of relaxing these constraints, through expansionary student loan
policies, show small positive enrollment responses (Johnson, 2013; Hai and Heckman, 2017).8 Other
studies highlight the need to address the intensive margins of enrollment as availability of loans and
repayment policies have sizable effects on student behaviors during college that affect human capital
accumulation. Black et al. (2020) find that increased student loan availability improves degree
completion for credit constrained students, while Joensen and Mattana (2020) find that students in
Sweden compensate for new repayment plans that make borrowing costlier by working more during
college, which leads to adverse affects on human capital accumulation. Furthermore, experimental
6The reviews by Deming and Dynarski (2010) and Nguyen et al. (2019) highlight that this type of gift aid
has beneficial effects, particularly for low-income populations: the federal Pell grant program, various state
and private scholarships, and smaller scale experiments generally increase a student’s likelihood of initial
enrollment, year to year persistence, and degree completion.
7Studies of earlier cohorts found little evidence for the existence of credit constraints, concluding that factors
such as college preparedness are the primary barriers to a college education (Keane and Wolpin, 2001;
Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and Taber, 2004).
8Programs in Chile that expanded availability of loans for students who clear a college admission threshold
show large increases in enrollment and persistence, which significantly reduces the income gap in enrollment
and postsecondary education attainment (Solis, 2017; Card and Solis, 2020).
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evidence from a community college shows that improving a student’s information about available
loan options increases education attainment (Marx and Turner, 2019).9
I contribute to this literature by explicitly modeling the student’s choice of college, while
also considering annual persistence in enrollment and part-time labor during college. As my data
include more information about the student’s choice set than other analyses, such as applications
and admissions, this dissertation is able to address the distribution of students across colleges
resulting from changes to loan policies.10 This margin of college choice is particularly relevant for
student welfare; analysis of a loan expansion in 1992 showed larger effects on college choice than
enrollment (Dynarski, 2003), while enrollment at high quality colleges offers a substantial earnings
premium (Dillon and Smith, 2020).
For the remainder of the dissertation, I describe the federal financial aid environment in the U.S.
and highlight relevant data trends in chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the model, chapter 4 outlines the
empirical specification, and chapter 5 describes the estimation strategy. Lastly, chapter 6 discusses
estimated parameters and model fit, chapter 7 evaluates current and hypothetical policies, and
chapter 8 concludes.
9Studies considering the student’s information set regarding loans rely on nudge interventions, and results
from such experiments depend on the context, scale, and design of the treatment. Bird et al. (2019) provide
a review of this literature and highlight the relevance of scale by finding no enrollment impacts of similar
interventions at the state and federal levels.
10This research does not focus on the implications on loan repayment behavior. Ionescu (2009) and Ionescu
and Simpson (2016) provide such an analysis of the expansion of federal loans and find a higher risk of
default in the private market.
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CHAPTER 2: DATA
2.1 U.S. Federal Financial Aid
To access federal financial aid, students must be citizens or eligible non-citizens, satisfy minimum
college enrollment conditions, and complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).
Two major avenues of federal aid, Pell grants and student loans, have both expanded over time.
Between 2004 and 2013, the college entry dates of the two cohorts in my data, the proportion of all
undergraduate students receiving Pell grants grew from 31 to 43 percent, the average grant provided
increased from $2,477 to $3,634, and the total volume of grants increased from $13.2 to $31.5
billion. College students primarily borrow from the federal government through the Stafford loan
program.1 From 2004 to 2013, the proportion of all undergraduates who borrowed Stafford loans
grew from 33.8% to 39.4%, the average annual amount they borrowed increased from $6,215 to
$6,986, and the total volume of undergraduate Stafford loans increased from $36.3 to $56.1 billion.
Pell Grants Pell grants are targeted towards low-income households with a strict schedule that
determines which students receive grants. After receiving the FAFSA, the office of Federal Student
Aid uses a legally defined formula to calculate a student’s expected family contribution EFCit as a
function of household finances and number of family members that may attend college. A full-time
1I abstract away from private student loans, which peaked in utilization in the 1980s and 1990s, for two
reasons (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011). First, total nonfederal loan volume decreased from 10.8 to
3.9 percent of all undergraduate aid between 2004 and 2013 and are mostly utilized by for-profit college
students (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2012; Baum et al., 2019). I exclude students who attend
for-profit colleges from my analysis. Second, my data does not have information on private loan utilization
and loan terms or their determinants, such as assets and credit ratings. I also abstract away from Perkins
subsidized loans, which constitute less than 1 percent of total aid volume and was discontinued in 2017.
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Students with sufficiently low EFCit are eligible for the Pell grant program, and furthermore,
the amount of the grant is restricted by the difference between the student’s cost of attendance τijt,
or a federally defined maximum amount ZPellt , and EFCit. Cost of attendance at college j includes
tuition, fees, room, and board minus any scholarships or grants the student receives, and thus can be
lower than the advertised sticker price.
Stafford Loans Loan terms include eligibility criteria, interest rates, borrowing limits, and repay-
ment horizon. Stafford loans can be either subsidized or unsubsidized. Both loans have low interest
rates varying annually between 3.4 and 6.8 percent from 2004 to 2013 that accrue from origination.
However, the government fully subsidizes the interest accrued during enrollment for subsidized
loans, making them more attractive to students.
A student can borrow subsidized loans only if her financial need Nijt, defined as her cost of
attendance net of expected family contribution and any received Pell grants, is positive.
Nijt = τijt − EFCit − Pellijt (2.2)
Both subsidized and unsubsidized loans have an exogenous federal borrowing limit. Regardless
of the federal limit, a student cannot borrow subsidized loans beyond her financial need and she
cannot borrow unsubsidized loans beyond her cost of attendance. Therefore, a student can borrow
an unsubsidized loan even if her financial need is zero; that is, she can use loans to cover the EFC.
Table 2.1 shows that, while the federal borrowing limits differ by the student’s year in college
and dependence status, the limits have increased only in 2007 and 2008 over the past twenty-five
years. As a result of this policy change, the real loan limit for dependent students at four-year
institutions increased from 19 to 35 percent of advertised cost of attendance for public college
in-state freshmen and from 9 to 16 percent for private college freshmen between 2006 and 2008
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(Figure 2.1). Appendix A provides an example of a student’s eligibility for each type of loan. Lastly,
the standard repayment plan allows students ten years after finishing college to pay back their
student debt.
Table 2.1: Annual Federal Stafford Loan Borrowing Limits (nominal USD)
Limit type 1994-2006 2007 2008-2019
Freshman Subsidized 2625 3500 3500
Total (subsidized + unsubsidized) 2625 3500 5500
Total (independent students) 6625 7500 11500
Sophomore Subsidized 3500 4500 4500
Total 3500 4500 6500
Total (independent students) 7500 8500 12500
Juniors & Seniors Subsidized 5500 5500 5500
Total 5500 5500 7500
Total (independent students) 10500 10500 14500
College aggregate Undergraduates 23000 23000 31000
Independent undergraduates 46000 46000 57500
2.2 Data Sources
Two nationally representative panel surveys of high-school students from the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) provide the most appropriate dataset for my research goals. The
Education Longitudinal Survey (ELS) of 2002 follows 16,197 students from 2002, when they were
in the 10th grade, to 2012. ELS supplements this cohort with a number of 12th grade students
in 2004 who were added to replace students who left the sample before 2004. The High School
Longitudinal Survey (HSLS) of 2009 is designed to be the successor to ELS, and follows 21,444
students from 2009, when they were in the 9th grade, to 2016.
NCES data include the necessary student characteristics (such as high-school transcripts,
standardized test scores, and geographic indicators) and outcomes of interest to address my research
questions: a student’s college applications with admission and institutional aid, her decision to
9
Figure 2.1: Federal Loan Limit as Share of Advertised Cost of Attendance
NOTE: Total federal loan limit for a dependent college freshman at a four-year institution, as a share of the
advertised cost of attendance.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS), Fall 2000 – Fall 2016
attend college, her choice of college, her annual student loan borrowing, and, in some cases, her
labor market earnings. Furthermore, ELS high-school students apply to college before the borrowing
limit increases of 2007 and 2008, while HSLS students apply after. Data from cohorts exposed
to these different loan environments provide policy variation necessary to estimate a causal effect.
A typical student in the HSLS enters college in 2013 and can borrow up to 29 and 14 percent of
advertised costs at four-year public in-state and private colleges, respectively, while the typical
student in the ELS who enters college in 2004 can borrow a lower share of advertised costs, up to
21 and 10 percent (Figure 2.1).
NCES also provides administrative data from each student’s Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA). I link my cohort data to annual college level data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). All college campuses that offer financial aid must
provide annual information to IPEDS, including a rich set of characteristics, such as in- and out-of-
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state tuition, cost of attendance, and total applications and enrollment. As a result, I am able to use
the student’s expected family contribution from her FAFSA and cost of attendance from IPEDS to
construct her financial need at each college she considers, which dictates her federal financial aid
eligibility. Lastly, I use historical college rankings from USNews2 to classify any campus as “elite”
if it is a state flagship institution or has ever been ranked as a top 50 university or top 25 liberal arts
college. The interactions of college control (public or private), level (two- or four-year), location
(in- or out-of-state), and elite status constitute the college type in my empirical model.
2.3 Student Characteristics and Enrollment Behavior
I analyze a sample3 of 7,960 students from the ELS who are eligible to enter college for the first
time in the 2004-2005 academic year, and 10,550 students from the HSLS who are eligible to enter
college for the first time in the 2013-2014 academic year.4 Henceforth, I refer to the cohorts by their
year of high school completion and potential college entry, as in the class of 2004 and the class of
2013. Due to data availability, I consider education decisions for the first three academic years after
high school exit of each cohort. Appendix A further details the analysis sample, data availability,
and variable construction.
Table 2.2 describes the characteristics of the estimation sample, revealing two demographically
similar cohorts with a few key differences. The class of 2013 have higher academic achievement,
as measured by a composite of high school grades and SAT scores, than the class of 2004. In
the model, colleges use this measure of academic achievement as signals of student ability to
determine admissions and institutional aid.5 Students in 2013 are also more likely than their 2004
2Compiled by Andrew G. Reiter and publicly-available at andyreiter.com/datasets/.
3In accordance with the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) restricted-use data guidelines, I report all
unweighted sample sizes rounded to the nearest ten.
4This reduced sample excludes students who transfer during college, attend graduate school immediately
after college, apply to more than five schools, or have missing data.
5A student’s academic signal is high if their SAT score is 1200 or above and if their high school GPA is 3.5
or greater. Students who have SAT scores below 1000 and high school GPA below 3.5 have a low signal,
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counterparts to come from a high-income household, more likely to complete the FAFSA, and have
fewer siblings. However, conditional on completing the FAFSA, expected family contributions
(EFC) remain unchanged across cohorts. This lack of difference suggests that families eligible for
federal aid have similar abilities to pay for their children’s college education according to the federal
government, despite different income levels and FAFSA completion rates. All of these observable
characteristics impact the student’s ability to receive aid from both federal and non-federal sources,
and consequently determine their financial need that affects the amounts students can borrow.
The top panel of table 2.3 shows the types of institutions in which students enroll. The largest
shift in college choice across cohorts occur at the lower end of the college quality spectrum; class of
2013 students are no more likely to attend elite colleges than their 2004 counterparts, but they are
more likely to attend public four-year non-elite institutions rather than two-year colleges. Further
examination of the students’ consideration set of available colleges highlights two factors entering
the student’s college choice decision: price and non-monetary preferences. The bottom panels of
table 2.3 show characteristics of the selective institutions attended by students in comparison to the
other selective institutions that offered them admissions, as well as the cost of less than four-year
institutions that I include in all students’ consideration sets as an outside option.
The advertised cost of attendance at all colleges in the student’s consideration set is higher for
the class of 2013 than the class of 2004. Interestingly, while both cohorts choose a cheaper college
relative to the rest of their consideration set, the advertised price difference is greater for the class of
2013. Furthermore, colleges not attended are similarly selective in comparison to those attended for
both cohorts, but colleges not attended are slightly more generous than the ones attended for the
class of 2013, offering greater amount of aid to more students. However, the higher levels of aid
offered do not sufficiently offset the higher advertised cost of attendance, suggesting that financial
constraints may bind in the student’s college choice decision.
and all other students have the middle signal. The class of 2013 has higher high school grades, likely due to
greater grade inflation; however, SAT scores are standardized within cohorts.
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Table 2.2: Student Characteristics for High School Classes of 2004 and 2013





Academic achievement in high school
HS GPA > 3.5 0.20 (0.40) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.47)
SAT ∈ [1000, 1200) 0.23 (0.42) 0.25∗∗ (0.43)
SAT ≥ 1200 0.12 (0.33) 0.13∗∗ (0.34)
Academic Signal, middle 0.32 (0.47) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.48)
Academic Signal, high 0.08 (0.27) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.31)
Demographic characteristics
Female 0.52 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
Black 0.12 (0.32) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.29)
Hispanic 0.13 (0.33) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.35)
Asian 0.09 (0.29) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.27)
Other Race 0.06 (0.23) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.29)
Household characteristics
Completed FAFSA 0.54 (0.50) 0.62∗∗∗ (0.48)
EFC ($1,000s) 12.521 (19.305) 12.334 (20.156)
Middle Income 0.41 (0.49) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.47)
High Income 0.29 (0.45) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.49)
Dependent Student 0.97 (0.17) 0.96∗∗∗ (0.20)
One Sibling 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47)
Multiple Siblings 0.33 (0.47) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.44)
Observations 7, 960 10, 550
NOTE: Stars show statistically significant differences of means between the Class of 2004 and the Class
of 2013. EFC is the expected family contribution as calculated by the FAFSA, and is only available if the
student and/or her family completed the FAFSA. All monetary amounts are in thousands of 2016 US dollars.
All unweighted sample sizes are rounded to nearest ten according to IES restricted-use data guidelines.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), 2004, and High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), 2013.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of Institutions in Admissions Set






Less than 4 years 0.33 (0.47) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.44)
Public, non-elite 0.34 (0.48) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.49)
Private, non-elite 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.37)
Public, elite 0.12 (0.32) 0.13∗∗ (0.34)
Private, elite 0.03 (0.18) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.13)
In-state 0.83 (0.38) 0.84 (0.37)
Less than 4 year institution characteristics
Cost of Attendance ($1,000s) 13.024 (2.624) 14.353∗∗∗ (2.628)
Characteristics of selective colleges attended
Cost of attendance ($1,000s) 22.007 (8.864) 25.009∗∗∗ (9.707)
Admission rate 0.65 (0.13) 0.62∗∗∗ (0.13)
Students receiving aid 0.66 (0.14) 0.71∗∗∗ (0.13)
Average aid ($1,000s) 6.443 (4.358) 7.885∗∗∗ (5.559)
Characteristics of selective colleges not attended
Cost of attendance ($1,000s) 23.242 (7.914) 27.654∗∗∗ (9.467)
Admission rate 0.65 (0.11) 0.62∗∗∗ (0.12)
Students receiving aid 0.67 (0.14) 0.73∗∗∗ (0.13)
Average aid ($1,000s) 6.476 (3.680) 8.592∗∗∗ (5.360)
Observations 7, 960 10, 550
NOTE: All four year colleges are selective. Selective colleges not attended include institutions where
students received admissions, but chose not to attend. Elite colleges are either a state flagship institution
or have ever been ranked as a top 50 university or top 25 liberal arts college. Cost of attendance is the
advertised sticker price, including tuition, room, board, and fees. Students with aid is the share of enrolled
students with any non-federal aid, and the average amount of aid is conditional on receiving aid. Stars
show statistically significant differences of means between the Class of 2004 and the Class of 2013. The
following characteristics of not attended selective institutions significantly differ from those of attended
selective institutions: cost of attendance and students receiving aid for both cohorts, and average aid for the
class of 2013 only. All monetary amounts are in thousands of 2016 US dollars. All unweighted sample sizes
are rounded to nearest ten according to IES restricted-use data guidelines.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), 2004, High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), 2013, and Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), Fall 2004 and Fall 2013.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.01
14
Beyond price, additional preferences for college type and location may drive student choices.
For example, students are more likely to attend public institutions and more than 80 percent of
students attend college in their home states. Therefore, the theoretical model accounts for the
non-pecuniary benefits in enrollment and the college choice decision in addition to the presence of
financial constraints.
Data trends beyond the initial college choice motivate additional features of the theoretical
model. Figure 2.2 shows enrollment, part-time labor, and federal loan borrowing for each cohort in
the first three years after exiting high school. Enrollment patterns are similar across cohorts, except
that Class of 2013 students are more likely to persist into their third year. We see that Class of
2004 students borrow less frequently and lower amounts than Class of 2013 students, but the latter
cohort’s borrowers are less likely to take out the maximum amount of loans, as set by federal limits.
This observation suggests that students who face higher borrowing limits are better able to borrow
their desired amounts; similarly, the borrowing constraints bound a significant proportion of the
2004 class from accessing funds to finance college. We also see that loan amounts are increasing
by the year of enrollment, which reflects the climbing borrowing limits by year of enrollment in
college. The data suggest that borrowing constraints are relevant for a large group of students and
highlights the need to explicitly model the student’s optimal borrowing decisions in such a loan
environment. Furthermore, 2013 students are less likely to work, especially early in their college
careers, than their 2004 counterparts. Taken together with fewer constraints on borrowing, such
behavior suggests a trade-off between work and borrowing as a means to finance college.
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Figure 2.2: College Enrollment, Part-time Labor, and Borrowing
(a) Undergraduate Enrollment (b) Part-time Labor, if enrolled
(c) Borrowing Rate, if enrolled (d) Borrowing at Limit, if borrowed
NOTE: The sample includes only those eligible to enter college for the first time in the 2004-05 academic
year or the 2013-14 academic year. Once a student exits college, she is not allowed to enroll again and is
considered to be part of the labor force.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), 2004–2007, High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), 2013–2016.
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL OF STUDENT DECISION-MAKING: APPLICATIONS,
ENROLLMENT, AND BORROWING
A dynamic discrete choice model describes high school graduating students’ decisions to apply
to college, enroll on an annual basis, and finance their education. Let t denote the academic years
after student i exits high school; she earns her high school diploma at the end of t = 0. She enters t
with observed state variables Ωit and ability µi that is known to herself, her family, and the colleges
to which she applies but unobserved to the researcher.
Table 3.1: Information Set at Beginning of Period t, Ωit
Observed characteristics
Yi Family income
ai Student’s high school academic signal
Fit Household has completed annual FAFSA
Xit Gender, race, number of siblings
First year after high school, t = 1
Bi Set of colleges that admit student i
τik1 Cost of attendance at each college k ∈ Bi, net of aid
EFCi1 Expected family contribution, determined by FAFSA
Subsequent years after enrolling at college j, t > 1
Sijt Level of schooling and type of college attended entering t
Dit Borrowing history entering t
Lit Ever worked part-time during college prior to t
Nijt Financial need for academic year t at college j
τijt Cost of attendance at college j, net of aid
The information available to the decision-maker Ωit (i.e., the vector of variables describing
the individual’s state at the beginning of each period) includes exogenous observed heterogeneity
and endogenous characteristics that evolve based on the student’s decision history and stochastic
shocks. Among the observed heterogeneity, the student’s family income Yi, academic signal ai, and
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FAFSA completion status Fit are key determinants of her decision making process. Endogenous
state variables include the set Bi of colleges offering the student admission, cost of attendance net
of institutional aid τijt, expected family contribution EFCit, financial need Nijt as defined by (2.1),
and decision histories associated with enrollment at college j. Table 3.1 defines each variable in Ωit
and establishes notation.
The timeline in figure 3.1 describes the sequence of the student’s decisions. To reduce notation,
I suppress the individual student subscript i. Entering each period t, she observes state variables Ωt
and ability µ.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Student’s Decisions after Final Year of High School t = 0
Apply to A
(∅ ∈ {A})
Enroll in college j,
Borrow,
Work part-time












B, τ, EFC ∈ Ω1
t = 2, . . . , t′
Ωt
t = t′ + 1, . . . , T
Ωt′Ωt+1
At the end of her last year in high school, t = 0, a student observes the posted cost of attendance
τ k1 at all colleges k for the following academic year, or the maximum any student will pay to attend
college k. She applies to a set of colleges A, which may include no colleges. If she does not send
any applications, she will have the option to enroll in a community college or enter the labor market
and inelastically supply labor at the end of high school. Once in the labor market, she may not
apply to or enroll in college again. Before t = 1, the student learns {B, τ1, EFC1} ∈ Ω1. She
simultaneously receives admission to a set of colleges B ⊆ A, corresponding individual cost of
attendance net of institutional aid τk1 at all admitting colleges k ∈ B, and her expected family
contribution EFC1, only if her family has completed the FAFSA.
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In t = 1, the student evaluates her college alternatives and financing methods based on the
lifetime value of welfare associated with each combination of options. She optimally chooses which
college to attend and a method to finance her education. She is personally responsible to pay the
price pk1 to enroll at college k, where pk1 factors in her parent’s contributions in addition to the
individual cost of attendance. She may forgo college enrollment and enter the labor market, or
jointly enroll at a college j ∈ B, borrow via student loans, and work part-time during her first year.
The student spends the subsequent academic years t = 2, . . . , t′ in college. Prior to each t, her
past observed choices and realized shocks update her state variables from Ωt−1 to Ωt. Specifically,
she learns her cost of attendance τjt and, if her family has completed the FAFSA, her financial need
Njt for the upcoming year t. In each t, the student may forgo enrollment (drop out)1 to enter the
labor market, or jointly decide to continue enrollment at college j, borrow, and work part-time. She
may not transfer colleges after initial enrollment in t = 1.
The student exits college j at the end of t′ by dropping out, graduating with an exogenous
probability, or completing the maximum years of schooling, t̄.2 For t = t′ + 1, . . . , T , the student
inelastically supplies labor, earns a wage conditional on finding employment, and repays student
debt.
3.1 Enrollment, Borrowing, and Part-time Labor Decision
The student spends academic years t = 1, 2, . . . , t′ in college. At the beginning of t, she evaluates
enrollment (ejt), borrowing (djt), and part-time work (ljt) alternatives at each college j ∈ B that
offers her admission to maximize her expected discounted value of lifetime utility. The student’s
1College dropout is not the focus of this paper, but an endogenous dropout decision allows for the associated
option value of a student’s decision to “try out” college, which Stange (2012) measures to be 14% of the
total benefits of college enrollment for the average student.
2The theoretical model can accommodate an endogenous graduation probability that depends on the student’s
decision history and unobserved ability. However, missing variables in the fourth year of the student’s
college enrollment and beyond do not allow for identification of the parameters of such an endogenous
graduation process. As a result, I estimate an exogenous graduation probability that depends on the college
and year of enrollment, which I discuss further in chapter 5.
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choice set at each college j includes all possible alternatives of (ejt, djt, ljt).
(ejt, djt, ljt) ∈ (0, 0, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not enroll
∪{(1, d, l) : d ∈ supp (djt) , l ∈ {0, 1}}︸ ︷︷ ︸
enroll at college j, borrow d, work part-time l
.
Furthermore, in t = 1, her choice set is {(ejt, djt, ljt)}j∈B, which includes each enrollment,
borrowing, and part-time labor alternative at all colleges j in her admission set B.
In each t, the student compares the expected lifetime value at time t of entering the labor market(
V Ljt
)




at time t of jointly enrolling at college j, borrowing d,
and working l, that is (ejt, djt, ljt) = (1, d, l). She may also directly enter the labor market without











For t = 2, . . . , t′, the student compares the values of the labor market option to the values of








∀t = 2, . . . , t′.
The j subscript on V Ljt shows that the value of entering the labor market in t > 1 depends on the
student’s past enrollment in college j.
The budget constraint (3.1) reflects that the student annually consumes borrowed amounts
djt and part-time labor income W , while paying pjt. The price of college pjt depends on cost of
attendance τjt, financial need Njt, and household characteristics. That is,
cjt = djt + ljtW − pjt. (3.1)
A borrowing constraint (3.2) sets an individual borrowing limit d̄jt on the amount she may borrow,
determined by her cost of attendance τjt net of any federal grants received Pellt or an exogenous
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federal borrowing limit d̄t.3 Specifically,
0 ≤ djt ≤ d̄jt ≡ min
{
τjt − Pelljt, d̄t
}
. (3.2)
Value Functions The student solves her optimization problem by choosing the alternative at time
t from {(ejt, djt, ljt)}j∈B in t = 1 and {(ejt, djt, ljt)} in t > 1 that has the highest lifetime value.
For each alternative that includes college enrollment at j, borrowing d, and part-time labor l, the
lifetime value is V dljt .
V dljt ≡ Vjt
(

















| (1, d, l)
]





V Ljt+1| (1, d, l)
]
t = t̄
The lifetime value at t of the alternative (ejt, djt, ljt) = (1, d, l) is a function of the student’s
state Ωt entering t, contemporaneous payoffs udljt, idiosyncratic taste shocks ε
dl
jt, and expected future
value conditional on the time t alternative (ejt, djt, ljt) = (1, d, l). The contemporaneous payoffs
sum the utility of consumption u(cjt) and non-pecuniary preferences ηdljt , which depend on the
alternative, college characteristics, student characteristics, and unobserved ability, to capture psychic
costs and benefits such as disutility of labor or preferences to attend college in the student’s home
state. Per period utility is
udljt = u
d+ l ·W − pjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
cjt
+ ηdljt.
The expectation of future value, conditional on each alternative, depends on future stochastic shocks
to wages, preferences, financial need, cost of attendance, and college graduation.





. I solve for the total amount she borrows, d∗jt, assuming that she borrows via subsidized loans
first as they accrue less interest than unsubsidized loans. If d∗jt is above the subsidized limit, the student






The student’s value, V Ljt , of entering the labor market at time t with the enrollment history
associated with college j reflects the indirect utility of her optimal consumption path from labor
market entry to retirement at T . Specifically,












She optimally smooths consumption and divides the present value of her expected lifetime










βs−tπEjs (Sjt, Lt)Wjs (Sjt)
]
− r (Dt,Rt, H)
)
∀s = t, . . . , T.
Expected lifetime earnings account for the probability of employment πEjs in any future year s,
which varies by accumulated education Sjt and part-time work experience Lt, and future wages Wjs,
which include returns to schooling. The student’s discounted lifetime payment r of accumulated
student debt depends on a vector of her borrowing history Dt = (d1, . . . , dt), interest rates Rt =
(R1, . . . , Rt) associated with each year of a student’s borrowing history, and repayment horizon H .
The value function captures trade-offs (between contemporaneous and future utility for each
alternative in the student’s choice set) that rationalize the student’s enrollment, her choice of college,
borrowing, and part-time labor during college that we observe in the data. College enrollment
provides future wage returns, which determine V Ljt+1, and current non-pecuniary benefits η
dl
jt while
costing the student pjt today. Employment accumulates human capital that is rewarded on the labor
market and provides additional income W during college, yet may impose a current psychic cost as
part of ηdljt . Borrowing relaxes the student’s current budget constraint, which can help her attend a
college that offers future wage premiums, but deducts loan repayment from future earnings that
reduces the value of the labor market option V Ljt+1 and imposes a psychic cost.
4Risk-averse individuals optimally smooth consumption from graduation to retirement assuming lifetime
earnings are perfectly insured after college and there exists a credit market with interest rate (1− β) /β.
The lifetime budget constraint equates discounted lifetime consumption with discounted lifetime expected
earnings net of repayment.
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3.2 Student’s Application Decision
Prior to t = 1, a student applies to a subset A of the colleges in her consideration set by maximizing
the expected discounted value of future lifetime utility associated with each subset of colleges to
which she may apply. The value of of applying to subset A is













She consumes c0, pays application cost ψA, and receives a preference shock εA specific to each
application set. At the time of applications, the student is uncertain about future admissions, institu-
tional aid, and expected family contribution as determined by her family’s filed FAFSA. These three
stochastic processes will determine the student’s available college choice set in t = 1: admissions
decisions define the set of colleges she may attend, and aid and expected family contribution (EFC)
determine the price of attendance and borrowing constraints she will face. Therefore, the expectation
of her future value depends on the probability of these three stochastic processes and her optimal
decisions in t = 1 conditional on the realization of admissions, institutional aid, and EFC.
Expected Family Contribution I do not explicitly model the FAFSA filing behavior, and instead
assume that a student’s family exogenously decides to file or not to file. After the student submits
her college applications, she learns her EFC. The federal government determines a student’s EFC
based on the household’s financial situation and the potential need to pay for additional children to
attend college. Therefore, the distribution of EFC depends on observable heterogeneity, such as
family income Y and number of siblings X .
P (EFC1) = f (X1, Y )
EFC does not depend on the colleges to which the student applies. Once determined, the student
and all the colleges to which she applies simultaneously learn EFC1.
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College Admissions and Institutional Aid A student’s probability of gaining admissions and
institutional aid depends on the information the college observes about her. Admissions offices at
colleges observe the student’s academic signal, through high school transcripts and standardized
exam scores, and unobserved ability, through written components and interviews that the researcher
does not observe. Furthermore, the aid office at the college receives the student’s EFC1. While the
institution as a whole observes both academic and financial characteristics of the student, I assume
the admissions office does not use any financial information about the student, motivated by popular
need blind admissions policies.
For a student applying to college j, her probability Pj of gaining admission, that is j ∈ B,
depends on her academic signal a and unobserved ability µ,
Pj ≡ P (j ∈ B) = fj (a, µ) .
The probability PAj of receiving aid at admitting college j, that is τj1 < τ j1, also depends on her
EFC.
PAj ≡ P (τj1 < τ j1|j ∈ B,EFC1) = fAj (EFC1, a, µ)
The j subscript highlights that colleges admit observationally similar students differently based
on each institution’s constraints and objective function. This admissions and aid policy can be
derived from the theoretical model of colleges as the suppliers of higher education described in
Appendix D, where the college has preferences over mean academic characteristics and ability of
its student body while facing budget and capacity constraints.5 Solution to a supply side model
shows that a college weighs the marginal benefit of admitting the student, measured by the student’s
marginal contribution to average academic characteristics, student body ability, and tuition revenue,
against the marginal cost of giving up a seat from its limited capacity. Therefore, the admissions
5Epple et al. (2006) and Fu (2014) provide an equilibrium analysis of the higher education market where
college admissions and pricing depend on anticipated enrollment decisions of the institution’s applicant
pool.
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office admits students with the same academic signal and ability equivalently as these students
present the same trade-off for the college.
The aid office additionally considers if the aid offer will induce a student to attend in relation
to the marginal cost of distributing limited funds for institutional aid. To forecast a student’s
enrollment, the aid office uses the available EFC to infer the final price a student would need to
pay to enroll, as EFC provides information on the family’s capacity to pay as well as the student’s
eligibility for federal aid. Furthermore, recall from (2.1) that a student’s federal Pell grants are
deterministic given her EFC and cost of attendance. The aid office offers students with the same
academic signal, ability, and EFC equivalent amounts of aid. Conditional on admissions, aid,
and EFC, the student can construct her financial need Nj1, as given by (2.2), for her first year of
enrollment at college j.
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
While the theoretical model highlights the constraints and trade-offs that influence a student’s
application, enrollment, choice of college, borrowing, and part-time labor decisions, estimation
of a tractable version of the model requires a few simplifying assumptions about the student’s
consideration set, preferences, price of college attendance, and evolution of state variables.
4.1 Student’s Consideration Set
To solve and estimate the student’s application decision and choice of college, I restrict the number
of colleges a student may consider. I assume that a student applies to and enrolls in a college of type
j, rather than an individual college. Each college type is an enrollment-weighted aggregate of the
individual colleges and, from the student’s perspective, all colleges that share a type are identical.1
Beyond tractability, college competition within types rationalizes a symmetric equilibrium, in
which colleges that share the same type have identical optimal admission and pricing decisions for
observationally similar students.
I define college types by the control, level, and location of the institution. There are five colleges
per state and two national private elite institutions. Specifically, each state has a community college,
public non-elite college, two private non-elite colleges, and a public elite college. The consideration
set of each individual student includes eleven colleges. In addition to the five in-state colleges,
she can also consider six out-of-state colleges: one public non-elite college, two private non-elite
1Models of a student’s application behavior utilize two approaches to reduce the dimension of the consider-
ation set: a similar method of aggregated individual institutions (Fu, 2014) or randomly drawing a set of
individual institutions (Arcidiacono, 2005).
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colleges, one public elite college, and two private elite institutions.2 I assume all students apply to
the community college and can send out a maximum of four additional applications to the remaining
ten colleges. Even with the reduced consideration set and maximum number of applications, a
student can choose from a set of 168 unique application portfolios. While a maximum number
of applications may appear restrictive, more than 90 percent of my sample send four or fewer
applications to selective colleges.3
4.2 Preferences
I assume log utility of consumption, u(c) = log (c) , and additive college-specific preferences for
students enrolled at college j,
ηdljt = ηj + ηd01[djt > 0] + ηddjt + ηlljt + ηdldjtljt + ηXXjt + ηµµ,
where contemporaneous utility is u (cjt) + ηdljt + ε
dl
jt. I normalize the utility of not enrolling in
college to zero. Therefore, preference parameter ηj captures the utility of being at college type
j, relative to entering the labor market. Non-linear psychic costs or benefits of borrowing affect
the student’s utility through the parameters ηd0, if she borrows anything, and ηd, specified to be
quadratic in the amount borrowed.
The parameters ηl and ηdl measure the preference for working, both while the student does
and does not borrow. Furthermore, I discretize the support of borrowing decisions to reduce the
computation burden. Specifically, a student may choose a set number of fractions δ ∈ [0, 1] of her
2I allow for two private institutions of each type because private four-year institutions double public four-year
institutions in number and to better fit observed application behavior. Depending on the college type, 20 to
30 percent of students who apply to any private institution also apply to a second institution of that type.
3Data for the class of 2013 only provides details on the first three applications. I impute additional applications
for a small group of students in order to complete their consideration sets. Appendix A describes the
imputation based on similarities in application profile, conditional on number of applications sent, between
the two cohorts.
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individual borrowing limit d̄jt to borrow, such that
djt = δd̄jt.
Student-college characteristics Xjt include race, gender, accumulated years of schooling, and
in-state status and ηX highlights preferences that can match heterogeneity in enrollment rates, such
as a desire to stay close to home, differential drop out rates by a student’s progress in college, and
enrollment trends of demographic groups. Lastly, ηµ measures preferences that vary by the student’s
unobserved ability, which I allow to differ by the college’s elite status to further capture sorting by
ability of students to elite colleges.







Value Type I distribution. The resulting choice probabilities PLjt and P
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4.3 Price of College Attendance
In order to attend college j, a student herself needs to pay for any remaining cost of attendance that
is not covered by institutional aid, family contributions FCt, and federal Pell grants Pellt. That is,
the price of attending college j is
pjt = τjt − FCt − Pelljt.
A student who does not complete the FAFSA is ineligible to receive federal Pell grants. For a
student who has completed the FAFSA, I can measure her financial need as the cost of attendance net
of expected family contribution and additional Pell grants. Substituting the definition for financial
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need (2.2) into the price function, we see that
pjt = (1− Ft) (τjt − FCt) + Ft (Njt + EFCt − FCt) .
Because the data do not provide dollar values of family contributions, I assume that the
family contribution depends on household income, the FAFSA completion status, and the student’s
unobserved ability. I parametrize the price function as a reduced form of the above theoretical
equation:





Parameters ηp1 and η
p
2 capture differences in family contribution and expected family contribution
by household income and FAFSA completion status, while ηpµ allows family contribution to vary by
the student’s unobserved ability.
4.4 Stochastic Processes Relevant to Student Decisions
Labor Market A student who exits college in t′ earns a wage in all periods t = t′ + 1, . . . , T , if
she is employed. Her log wages are
logWt = γ0 + γjSjt′ + γ
CG
j + γq + γXXt′ + γZZt′ + γµµ+ γgt + ε
W
t (4.3)
Wages depend on human capital and characteristics that are fixed after the student leaves college
at t′. The return γj to the years of schooling Sjt′ estimate the wage premiums for completing an
additional year of college, while allowing the return to vary by the level of the institution (two-
or four-year). The return γCGj measures the wage premium of college graduation.
4 The return
γq measures any premium associated with attending an elite institution. A vector Xt′ and ability
4As the primary purpose of this paper is to understand college choice, I abstract away from signaling effects.
If policies result in large shifts to college enrollment, wages may adjust due to a change in the signal that a
certain type of college provides to employers. Students may learn of changes to their college’s signal after
enrollment and are more likely to adjust dropout and borrowing behavior once these shocks are realized than
they are to internalize such effects ex-ante in a way that would alter their college choice.
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µ control for observed demographic characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity, respectively.
Aggregate measures Zt′ of a student’s home state’s labor market in the year she enters the labor
market include share of labor force with college degrees and employment rates of those with and
without college degrees. Wage growth γgt for t > t′ is concave in potential work experience (t− t′).
Lastly, wage shocks in each period follow a normal distribution, εWt ∼ N (0, σ2W ).
The probability of employment πEjt depends on similar factors as wage determination, as well
as an indicator for if the student ever worked during college, Lt′ . Assuming employment shocks




= π0 + πjSjt′ + π
CG
j + πq + πXXt′ + πZZt′ + πµµ+ πgt. (4.4)
During her time in the labor market, the student repays the loan principal and all accumulated
interest with H equal annual payments. This specification closely matches the standard loan
repayment plan.5











Initial Period Admissions, Aid, and Cost of Attendance Recall from section 3.2 that a college j
offers admission based on a student’s academic signal and ability and the aid office also considers
EFC while constructing their aid offer. For a student applying to college j, I model the admissions
probability Pj and aid probability, conditional on admissions, PAj with a logistic specification. I
assume that conditional on unobserved ability µ, admissions and aid shocks are not correlated
5The standard repayment plan is the most popular option and students make fixed monthly payments. A
different form of the function r (·) can handle alternate repayment plans or more general borrowing histories
that include a combination of subsidized and unsubsidized loans. Another common repayment option is the
income-based plan where students pay a portion of their income until the loan balance is repaid; under this
plan, the loan horizon is heterogeneous: H = H (Dt′ ,Rt′).
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within and across universities.
Pj (µ) =
exp (αj + αaja+ αµjµ)






















A student who files the FAFSA also learns her expected family contribution, which I model to
be a function of household income, number of siblings, and the student’s cohort. Given realizations
of admissions, aid, and EFC, the student can calculate her financial need, and consequently her
price pj1 for the first year of enrollment at college j according to (4.2). Therefore, conditional on
application set A, the joint distribution of receiving admissions at the set of colleges B, associated
aid, and EFC is
















(1− Pk) , (4.5)




is the density of EFC (specified in
Appendix B). The student receives rejections from all colleges k ∈ A \B.
Cost of Attendance During College For a FAFSA non-filing student in college in t > 1, her
annual price pjt is a function of stochastic cost of attendance τjt that depends on the posted tuition,
institution characteristics, individual characteristics, unobserved ability, and an idiosyncratic shock
ετt characterized by the density f (ετt). For a FAFSA filing student in college in t > 1, her annual
price pjt can be written as a function of financial need Njt as shown in (4.2). Therefore, conditional
on knowing Njt, the cost of attendance net aid τjt and expected family contribution EFCt are
irrelevant. Rather than separately modeling the stochastic processes for τjt and EFCt, I model the
stochastic process for Njt alone, as Njt also explicitly enters the student’s borrowing constraint. As
observed financial need is censored to be nonnegative, I model the stochastic process for the latent
financial needN∗jt to be a function of posted tuition, institution and individual characteristics, factors
that determine EFC and Pell grants, unobserved ability, and idiosyncratic shock εNt characterized
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by the density f (εNt). Appendix B provides the full specification of the stochastic processes of
both cost of attendance for FAFSA non-filers and financial need for FAFSA filers.
4.5 Application Cost
The cost ψA of applying to the set A of colleges depends on individual heterogeneity, the number of
applications sent, and the types of colleges to which the student applied, where
ψA = ψ + ψY Y + ψaa+ ψj + ψk + ψµ
This specification reflects that students may experience a fixed cost of sending any applications that
vary by the student’s household income Y , academic signal a, cohort, and unobserved ability µ. The
variable component of the application cost depends on the type j of colleges in her application set
and the number k of colleges, which enters as a quadratic to allow lower marginal costs of sending
additional applications. Assuming that taste shocks εA for applying to set A follow an Extreme
Value Type I distribution, the associated choice probabilities of each set A are






It is important to discuss how the estimated structural parameters are identified using the data
discussed in chapter 2. Before doing so, I first describe a set of calibrated parameter values and
their source (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Calibrated Parameters of the Structural Model
Parameter Description Value Source and/or notes
β Discount factor 0.95 Calibrated
W Annual part-time labor income $8,415 Median student-worker earnings:
$8.25/hour wage and 20 hours
worked/week during the school year.
Further assumption: 30 weeks worked
per academic year and 35 hours per
week over 12 weeks of summer.
c Consumption floor $2,800 Hai and Heckman (2017)
t̄ Maximum years of schooling
(4-year institutions)
4
Maximum years of schooling
(community colleges)
2
T Retirement horizon 50
(years from age 18)
H Debt repayment horizon (years
after college exit)
10 Standard repayment plan
Due to data limitations, I am unable to jointly estimate graduation probabilities with the rest of
the model. Specifically, FAFSA and part-time labor behavior are missing in the fourth and later
years of college enrollment, which prevents me from observing the student’s optimal decisions for
those years, and consequently from modeling the selection into the fourth year. However, I use the
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class of 2004 to estimate graduation probabilities separately as a function of year of enrollment,
type of college, and demographic characteristics.
5.1 Estimation Strategy
I estimate structural parameters of the model using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). I assume
that unobserved ability µ can be approximated by a support of M discrete types1 with φm denoting






















where each L·i|µm represents the likelihood contribution of observed choices and stochastic processes
for a student i, conditional on µ = µm. The six likelihood contributions, conditional on unobserved
ability µ, are:
1. LWi|µ is the likelihood contribution of employment and observed wages for years t = t
′ +
1, . . . , T after college. Parameters ΓW include wage coefficients γ and variance σ2w that
characterize the density fW of wages as specified in (4.3), and employment coefficients π that
characterize the probability of employment πEjt(µ) conditional on unobserved ability (4.4).
The indicator IEit signifies if i is employed at t.





)1−IEit (πEjt(µ)fW (εWt |µ))IEit
2. LNi|µ is the likelihood contribution of financial need Njt for FAFSA filers after they enter
college, for years t = 2, . . . , t′. Parameters ΓN include coefficients αN and variance σ2N
characterize the density fN of financial need as specified in (B.1), and the indicator INit
1Several studies validate this method of addressing unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Singer, 1984;
Mroz and Guilkey, 1992; Mroz, 1999). In this version, I use two discrete types, that is M = 2.
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signifies that Njt > 0.






)1−INit fN (εNt |N∗jt > 0, µ)INit
3. Lτi|µ is the likelihood contribution of cost of attendance τjt for FAFSA non-filers after they
enter college, for years t = 2, . . . , t′. Parameters Γτ include coefficients ατ and variance σ2τ
that characterize the density f τ of cost of attendance as specified in (B.2).




4. Lji|µ is the likelihood contribution of annual college decisions (ejt, djt, ljt) for t = 1, . . . , t
′,
where choice probabilities PLjt and P
dl
jt , conditional on unobserved ability, are defined in
(4.1). Parameters include estimated preference and price function parameters η, parameters
of the stochastic processes for the labor market, financial need, and cost of attendance, and
calibrated discount factor β.
Lji|µ ≡ L
j


























= (1, d, l)
]
· P dljt (µ)
}
5. L0i|µ is the log likelihood contribution of initial period admissions, aid, and EFC, given
parameters Γ0 =
{
α, αA, αE, σ2E
}
and the joint distribution of admissions, aid, and EFC
described by (4.5).
L0i|µ ≡ L0i (Γ0|µ) = P (B, τj1, EFC1|µ)
6. Lastly, LAi|µ is the likelihood contribution of observed applications, which depend on the
cost parameters ψ, preference parameters η, and parameters that determine the remaining
stochastic processes {Γ0,Γτ ,ΓN ,ΓW}. The choice probabilities for applying to set J of
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colleges conditional on unobserved ability is given by (4.6).
LAi|µ ≡ LAi (ψ, η,Γ0,Γτ ,ΓN ,ΓW |µ) =
∑
J
1 [A∗ = J ] · PJ (µ)
I denote all the estimated parameters in the student model as ΘS = {ψ, η,Γ0,Γτ ,ΓN ,ΓW}. In the
absence of unobserved ability µ, maximizing the log likelihood ˜̀ is equivalent to maximizing the
above six likelihood contributions for the entire sample in sequence (i.e. independently). In that case,
the likelihood contributions of wages, financial need, and cost of attendance are independent and one
can obtain consistent estimates of {Γτ ,ΓN ,ΓW}. Given these
{
Γ̂W , Γ̂N , Γ̂τ
}
, I can then maximize
the likelihood of annual college decisions to estimate η̂. I can then maximize the likelihood of
initial conditions to estimate Γ̂0. Lastly, given
{
η̂, Γ̂0Γ̂W , Γ̂N , Γ̂τ
}
I can maximize the likelihood
contribution of application behavior to estimate ψ̂.
However, one cannot sequentially estimate the log likelihood ˜̀ in the presence of unobserved
ability as the error terms are correlated. Estimation becomes computationally costly because my
model includes a large number of alternatives (especially college application sets) and a large state
space. For similar such applications, Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) show that the expectations
maximization (EM) algorithm with a sequential maximization step yields consistent estimates.2
In applications similar to mine where agent decisions can be divided into stages with distinct
parameters (such as costs of application, preferences for enrollment,and returns to education), this
sequential procedure can offer large computation savings but is less efficient than full information
maximum likelihood.
To implement the EM algorithm, I use a version of the log likelihood function that is equivalent
to ˜̀ but restores additive separability of its contributions. Specifically, I estimate parameters
2Arcidiacono (2005) implements this estimation procedure in a model of college and major choice that has
similar decision stages as my model.
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where each `i|µm represents the logs of each of the six likelihood contributions Li|µm for a student i,
and qmi is the probability of being type m, conditional on the observed data Xi. This conditional
probability qm is derived using Bayes’ theorem to be
qmi ≡ P (µi = µm|Xi,ΘS, φ) =























The algorithm iterates the below steps until estimates for the distribution of unobserved types



























Note that since qmi is taken as given, I can sequentially estimate each expected log likelihood
contribution in (5.1).
2. Update q̂mi using the estimated Θ̂S as shown in (5.2), and update the unconditional type
probabilities as φ̂m = 1N
∑
q̂mi .
5.2 Identification of Structural Parameters
Identification of the structural parameters of the model relies on the distribution of unobserved
ability and plausibly exogenous variation in prices and federal policies that impact a student’s
decision-making at each stage. As the student’s endogenous state variables are comprised of her
decision histories, it is important to control for selection along these decision margins to avoid
biased estimates of key parameters. For example, a model without unobserved ability may predict
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that a student who borrows high amounts today would discontinue enrollment in future years
because the marginal net returns to college completion are lower due to higher accumulated student
debt. However, since a student of high ability expects greater future earnings on the labor market,
she may choose to borrow more and accumulate greater debt. At the same time, she may have
strong preferences for college enrollment; as a result, a model with unobserved ability would show
that a student who borrows high amounts today would prefer to continue enrollment – the opposite
implication from ignoring unobserved ability. Empirically, the model without unobserved ability
would understate the psychic costs of borrowing if the data suggest borrowers persist longer in
college.
My estimation method controls for selection due to unobserved ability at various stages, by
jointly estimating students’ choices, stochastic outcomes, and the distribution of unobserved ability.
This joint estimation mitigates concerns over bias because the identifying assumption requires
shocks to preferences and stochastic processes to be idiosyncratic and uncorrelated over time and
with endogenous state variables, conditional on µ and not unconditionally. For models of college
enrollment, it is important to properly identify the relative importance of the returns to education
to other preferences for college enrollment in order to conduct accurate policy analysis. Students
endogenously accumulate education and high ability individuals are more likely to enroll in college
due to lower psychic costs than low ability individuals. Similarly, high ability individuals likely
earn more than observationally similar low ability individuals. Estimating the model without
unobserved ability would overstate both the returns to education and the psychic costs of enrollment:
accumulated education would be positively correlated with unobserved components in the wage
function and the resulting higher returns to education would imply students face higher psychic
costs of enrollment to match observed enrollment rates.
Joint estimation recovers the distribution of unobserved ability by using information from
several time periods for an individual. I assume students are of different types, or ability levels. In
the data, clusters of students systematically deviate in their outcomes and behaviors from model
predictions based on observed characteristics, such as high school achievement and household
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income. For example, a student with mediocre high school grades may get into an elite college,
enroll, and eventually earn more than other graduates from elite institutions. The magnitude of these
deviations from model predictions identify the relative importance of unobserved ability at each
decision and outcome stage (such as preference for college and returns to education). The relative
size of the student population that exhibits these deviations identifies the unconditional probability
mass of each type.
In addition to selection, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in prices and federal policies
and control for confounding factors to reduce estimation bias. From a student’s perspective, posted
tuition rates, federal loan limits, interest rates, and Pell grant limits provide exogenous variation
in the price a student will eventually pay to enroll today. Variation in prices across colleges and
across time and variation in federal policies across time help identify a student’s price elasticity
of the demand for college. A possible concern over federal policy variation may be that the
Great Recession coincided with changes to federal loan policies in 2007 and 2008; consequently,
changes to labor market returns that determine college enrollment would confound the effects of
relaxing credit constraints. However, I control for labor market conditions that affect the aggregate
economy and the specific returns to college enrollment using unemployment rates, employment to
population ratios for college graduates, and share of the labor market with college degrees. These
labor market variables further strengthen identification of college preferences, even outside of the
Great Recession, by shifting the value of the labor market option, which provides variation in the
opportunity cost of college enrollment.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
This section discusses a subset of estimated parameters that measure the key economic mecha-
nisms of the model, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, and the resulting goodness of fit. I
discuss all remaining parameter estimates in Appendix C.
6.1 Non-Pecuniary Benefits of College Enrollment
Estimates of preference parameters, η̂, include non-pecuniary preferences that vary by alternative,
institutional heterogeneity, and individual characteristics. A student faces psychic costs of enroll-
ment at any college, as shown by negative preference parameters in Table 6.1. Such a result is
expected as future gains to a college education are high, yet a substantial number of students do not
enroll in college. Similarly, there are psychic costs to borrowing any money to finance a college
education; however, these costs decrease as the student borrows more. These non-linear preferences
for borrowing manifest in the data as we observe that most students either do not borrow or borrow
at the limit.
6.2 Application Cost
Table 6.2 shows parameter estimates ψ̂, which include fixed and variable application costs. As
expected, the fixed cost of applications are lower for students with higher academic signals and
higher household incomes. The class of 2013 also faces lower application costs, signifying greater
access to online and common applications.
The variable cost of application is greater for elite institutions than non-elite, and greater for
out-of-state institutions than in-state. I rationalize these results as students needing to conduct more
research or fill out more application components for elite or out-of-state institutions. While per
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Table 6.1: Estimates of Preference Parameters: Non-Pecuniary Benefits of College Enrollment
Any Borrowing −2.317
Amount Borrowed ($1,000s) 0.884
Amount Borrowed Squared ($1,000s) −0.079
Part-time Labor 0.271













Year in Community College = 2 4.737
Year in Four-Year College = 2 1.601
Year in Four-Year College > 2 1.834
Type 2 1.630
Type 2 at Elite Institution −2.035
Distribution of UH
P (Type 2) 0.382
NOTE: Future version will provide bootstrapped standard errors.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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application costs are high, there are reductions in marginal cost per application as students apply to
more colleges, shown by the negative parameter on applications squared.






Class of 2013 −3.369
Type 2 −0.201
Variable Cost
In-state Public Non-elite −1.511
Out-of-state Public Non-elite 0.398
In-state Private Non-elite 0.398
Out-of-state Private Non-elite 0.855
In-state Public Elite 0.647
Out-of-state Public Elite 1.916
Private Elite 1.932
Number of applications 3.283
Number of applications squared −0.389
NOTE: Future version will provide bootstrapped standard errors.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
6.3 Labor Market Returns
Table 6.3 shows there are high returns to education on the labor market. Each additional year of
enrollment results in a 4.3 percent and 5.9 percent wage increase for two-year and four-year college
enrollees, respectively. Furthermore, college graduation and enrollment at an elite college show
even larger wage gains of 21.6 percent and 18.7 percent. Employment probability also increases in
education attainment; however, the effects are greatest for college graduates and those with some
work experience during college. The labor market exclusion restrictions Z also seem to be salient
and provide confidence in identifying the future labor market returns of college enrollment.
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Table 6.3: Labor Market Returns
Log Wages Employment
OLS Logistic
Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E.)
Years of Schooling 0.043 (0.007) 0.093 (0.028)
× Four Year 0.016 (0.011) −0.045 (0.024)
College Graduate 0.216 (0.023) 0.507 (0.078)
Elite College 0.187 (0.023) 0.388 (0.071)
Ever Worked in College 0.526 (0.048)
Labor Force with College Degree 0.007 (0.001) 0.006 (0.003)
Employment Ratio, College Graduate 0.018 (0.008)
Employment Ratio, No College 0.027 (0.006)
Unemployment Rate −0.070 (0.017)
Constant 1.906 (0.040) −3.085 (0.671)
Type 2 0.270 (0.012) 2.910 (0.053)
σW 0.634 (0.005)
Observations 12, 800 30, 810
NOTE: Labor market conditions are measured at the state level. Employment ratio is the employment to
population ratio in the state for those with college degrees and those without. Estimation includes controls
that are not presented in this table: gender, race, and years of potential labor market experience. Standard
errors are not adjusted, future version will provide bootstrapped standard errors. All unweighted sample sizes
are rounded to nearest ten according to IES restricted-use data guidelines.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
6.4 Admissions and Aid
Each institution type offers admission based on academic signal and unobserved type, while the aid
office further considers the student’s FAFSA completion and EFC. Table 6.4 shows coefficients
on interaction terms between the institution type and student characteristics that are relevant to
admission and aid outcomes. For example, at an in-state non-elite public college, a student with a
high academic signal is more likely to gain admissions, represented by a positive coefficient or log
odds ratio of 2.482, than a student with a low signal, represented by the constant. The patterns are
intuitive as elite institutions are more selective than non-elite for all students.
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Table 6.4: Admission and Aid Offer
Coefficients (s.e.) for college type × student characteristics
Constant Academic Signal FAFSA EFC Type 2
Middle High
Offered Admission
In-state Public Non-elite 0.713 1.368 2.482 0.652
(0.029) (0.040) (0.123) (0.037)
Out-of-state Public Non-elite 0.532 1.285 1.785 1.033
(0.070) (0.091) (0.185) (0.085)
In-state Private Non-elite 0.737 1.464 2.362 1.073
(0.055) (0.076) (0.184) (0.069)
Out-of-state Private Non-elite 0.842 0.719 1.400 0.989
(0.065) (0.075) (0.124) (0.071)
In-state Public Elite −0.193 0.978 2.057 0.667
(0.067) (0.071) (0.092) (0.058)
Out-of-state Public Elite 0.123 1.065 1.170 0.741
(0.103) (0.112) (0.131) (0.092)
Private Elite −1.055 0.608 0.993 −0.063
(0.191) (0.200) (0.193) (0.073)
Observations 26, 150
Offered Aid
In-state Public Non-elite −1.388 0.189 1.305 0.896 −0.032 1.257
(0.053) (0.049) (0.091) (0.046) (0.002) (0.052)
Out-of-state Public Non-elite −1.956 0.236 1.497 1.910 −0.026 1.204
(0.116) (0.107) (0.198) (0.099) (0.003) (0.115)
In-state Private Non-elite −0.633 0.682 1.331 1.201 −0.008 0.827
(0.089) (0.084) (0.141) (0.079) (0.002) (0.090)
Out-of-state Private Non-elite −1.616 0.437 1.515 2.332 −0.012 1.468
(0.089) (0.085) (0.122) (0.075) (0.002) (0.086)
In-state Public Elite −1.105 0.062 0.459 0.966 −0.020 1.224
(0.126) (0.123) (0.133) (0.083) (0.002) (0.097)
Out-of-state Public Elite −1.598 0.208 0.560 1.085 −0.014 0.812
(0.228) (0.219) (0.248) (0.146) (0.003) (0.168)
Private Elite −4.749 2.751 3.353 2.534 −0.036 2.770
(0.490) (0.490) (0.483) (0.137) (0.003) (0.172)
Observations 9, 680
NOTE: Future version will provide bootstrapped standard errors. All unweighted sample sizes are rounded to
nearest ten according to IES restricted-use data guidelines.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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Similarly, these institutions offer more aid to students with high academic signals. Interestingly,
FAFSA completion crowds in institutional aid, perhaps as an incentive mechanism for students to
explore all avenues to fund college. The aid offer does decrease as EFC increases; estimates imply
that a family with a $70,000 expected family contribution can expect similar probabilities of aid
offers at private elite institutions as a family that does not complete the FAFSA.
6.5 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Parameter estimates suggest that the two unobserved types significantly impact various aspects of
decision-making and likely measure student ability or motivation. For example, a type 2 student has
stronger preferences for college enrollment (Table 6.1), finds applications to be less costly (Table
6.2), and is more likely to receive admissions and aid from all colleges (Table 6.4). Furthermore, a
type 2 student also faces higher returns on the labor market as shown in Table 6.3 – she earns a wage
premium that is greater than the returns from college graduation conditional on years of schooling
and is more likely to find employment. Firms and colleges are better able to detect determinants of
productivity unobserved by the researcher, such as ability or motivation; therefore, consistent gains
on the labor market and admission process across the life-cycle enjoyed by a student identifies her
unobserved type that also correlates with her preferences for college.
6.6 Model Fit
Figure 6.1 compares the model’s ability to simulate student application and college choice behaviors
against observed outcomes. The model fits application behaviors well on both the extensive margin
of total number of applications and the intensive margin of applications sent to each type of school.
I assume that application to a community college is arbitrary; that is, the student simply decides
to enroll. Therefore, the figure shows the number of applications sent to four-year institutions.
Once a student receives admission decisions, she may decide to not enroll in college, or choose a
type of college to attend. The model fits the extensive margin of college enrollment quite well and
generally matches the patterns of college choice. The model predicts that students attend public elite
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institutions more frequently than the data, while simulating lower enrollment at public non-elite
institutions than the data.
Figure 6.2 shows a similar comparison of the model’s prediction of annual student enrollment,
borrowing, and part-time labor decisions to observed trends in the data. The model fits annual
enrollment behavior well, suggesting the economic mechanisms present sufficiently capture students’
college persistence. While the model does not perfectly fit students’ part-time labor supply, it is able
to capture the concavity in labor supply over the tenure in college. The model predicts the borrowing
rate and prevalence of binding borrowing constraints well for most years, with the exception of
over-predicting borrowing in the second year and under-predicting binding borrowing constraints in
the first year.
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Figure 6.1: Model Fit: Applications and College Choice
(a) Number of Applications to Selective Colleges
(b) Enrollment at Types of Colleges
NOTE: The sample includes only those eligible to enter college for the first time in the 2004-05 academic
year or the 2013-14 academic year. Bars marked as “Model” are simulated outcomes from the estimated
model.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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Figure 6.2: Model Fit: Annual Enrollment, Borrowing, and Part-time Labor
(a) Undergraduate Enrollment (b) Part-time Labor, if enrolled
(c) Borrowing Rate, if enrolled (d) Borrowing at Limit, if borrowed
NOTE: The sample includes only those eligible to enter college for the first time in the 2004-05 academic
year or the 2013-14 academic year. Once a student exits college, she is not allowed to enroll again and is
considered to be part of the labor force. Bars marked as “Model” are simulated outcomes from the estimated
model.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY ANALYSIS
Using the estimated structural parameters and re-solving the student’s decision-making process,
I simulate student outcomes under various policy environments, both current and hypothetical. First,
I measure to what extent the increase of loan limits in 2007 and 2008 relaxed borrowing constraints.
Second, I test three higher education subsidies: increased loan limits that relax credit constraints,
additional Pell grants that target low-income households, and tuition-free public colleges. These
subsidies represent policy levers that allow the federal government to relax a student’s borrowing or
budget constraint. Lastly, I discuss welfare implications of each policy and the effects of supply
side responses in college pricing.
7.1 Loan Limits and Credit Constraints
For dependent students, the changes to federal loan policy in 2007 and 2008 increased loan
limits by at most $2,000 per year (in nominal dollars). Counterfactual analysis shows that even
this small increase in loan limits, relative to the annual cost of college attendance, substantially
relaxed students’ credit constraints. The model simulates student behaviors assuming two policy
environments: observed loan limits (including changes in 2007 and 2008) and loan limits fixed at
pre-2007 levels. As shown in figure 7.1, the model predicts that the share of borrowers at the limit
for the class of 2013 is 6.5 to 10.8 percentage points (pp) lower than the share for the class of 2004.
However, if the limits were unchanged from before 2007, we see that class of 2013 borrowers are
more likely to be constrained: the share of borrowers at the limit for the class of 2013 is 4.2 pp
lower than the class of 2004 at college entry, but up to 6 pp higher by the time students enter their
third year. This difference suggests that evolving individual characteristics, costs of education, and
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labor market conditions led to greater demand for borrowing among students in the later cohort that
would not have been met had loan limits not increased in 2007 and 2008.
Figure 7.1: Share of Borrowing Students at Limit: Class of 2013 relative to Class of 2004
NOTE: Percentage point difference between the share of the class of 2013 borrowers at the limit and the
share of the class of 2004 borrowers at the limit.
7.2 Policy Alternative 1: Relaxing Credit Constraints
The Department of Education regulates the student loan market by primarily adjusting borrowing
limits and interest rates. I consider a policy that increases each student’s borrowing limit by $4,000.
Such an increase in the loan limit is equivalent to the additional amount independent students
are allowed to borrow. As a result, enrollment increases by 4.2 percentage points (pp), or by 6.1
percent in comparison to the current environment where 31.5 percent of students do not enroll
in any college (Figure 7.2). The rise in borrowing limit primarily affects enrollment in four-year
non-elite institutions, as 3.2 pp more students enroll at these colleges, an increase of 9.3 percent.
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This increase in enrollment also translates to greater persistence in college, as seen by a 3.6 to 4.8
pp increase in enrollment rate in subsequent years of college.
Figure 7.2: Effects of Policies on Enrollment and Choice of College
(a) Enrollment and Choice of College at t = 1
(b) Annual Enrollment
NOTE: The baseline model predicts 31.5% of students are not enrolled, 21.9% enroll at community colleges,
34.4% enroll at four-year non-elite colleges, and 12.1% enroll at four-year elite colleges.
Columns labeled as (1) of Table 7.1 show which students drive the change in enrollment.
The overall increase in enrollment ranges between 3.8 and 4.8 pp, with low- and middle-income
students’ enrollment increasing by 6.4 and 6.5 percent, respectively. Specifically, low-income
type 2 students benefited the most with 7.3 percent higher enrollment. Relaxing credit constraints
primarily increases four-year non-elite institution enrollment, by 7.1 to 11.5 percent, for all but
the low-income type 1 students. For this group, two-year enrollment increases the most, by 8.5
percent. While there is some substitution away from elite institutions for high-income students, the
magnitude is small with a decrease in enrollment by only 2 percent.
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7.3 Policy Alternative 2: Targeted Subsidies
The federal government targets education subsidies through the Pell grant program. I test a change
to the program that increases the maximum Pell grant award by $4,000. Recall from (2.1) that a












Therefore, increasing ZPellt would provide low-income students with higher levels of grants,
while also providing small grants to those on the eligibility margin. While the overall effect on
enrollment is small, low-income enrollment increases by 2.2 pp (column 2 in Table 7.1). Most
of this increase in low-income student enrollment leads to higher community college enrollment,
by 7.8 percent. The small change in Pell grants represent a larger share of the cost of attendance
at a community college than at more expensive four-year colleges. While Pell grants are strictly
need based, the findings suggest interesting correlations with student ability. Low-income type 2
students benefit the most as their overall enrollment increases by 7.6 percent and community college
enrollment increase by 12.3 percent, likely because type 2 students have stronger preferences for
college enrollment.
7.4 Policy Alternative 3: Free Tuition at Public Colleges
With the cost of college attendance increasing greatly, there exist several calls for free colleges. I
evaluate a policy that makes it free for any student to attend a community college or a non-elite
four-year institution within her state. The student still needs to apply and gain admissions to the
non-elite four-year institution. Figure 7.2 shows a similar enrollment effect to increased loan limits,
but students shift more toward community college. Column (3) in Table 7.1 shows heterogeneous
take up of this policy by income and unobserved ability. Enrollment gains on the extensive margin
are inversely related to household income, with low-income enrollment increasing by 10.2 percent
and high-income enrollment increasing by 2.1 percent. However, low-income students primarily
52
increase enrollment at community colleges, whereas high-income students shift enrollment towards
four-year colleges. While free tuition to public colleges seems to reduce the college enrollment
gap by income, the policy also induces sorting to different college types that may simultaneously
increase the gap in the quality of colleges these students attend.
Table 7.1: Enrollment in Types of Colleges under Different Education Subsidies, by Income and
Unobserved Type
Overall Type 1 Type 2
B (1) (2) (3) B (1) (2) (3) B (1) (2) (3)
Low-Income
No college 39.9 −3.8 −2.2 −6.1 37.0 −4.0 −0.7 −6.0 44.1 −4.1 −4.2 −6.3
Community College 24.3 2.0 1.9 6.2 25.9 2.2 1.4 6.0 22.2 0.7 2.7 5.0
Four-Year Non-Elite 26.9 1.9 −0.2 1.3 25.3 1.9 −1.2 1.9 30.0 2.9 1.1 1.4
Four-Year Elite 8.9 −0.1 0.5 −1.4 11.8 −0.2 0.5 −1.9 3.7 0.5 0.4 −0.1
Middle-Income
No college 33.4 −4.3 −1.4 −3.7 31.2 −4.8 −1.5 −3.9 36.7 −4.5 −1.8 −3.9
Community College 23.5 1.1 0.4 3.3 25.1 1.0 −0.1 2.4 21.9 1.6 0.9 3.4
Four-Year Non-Elite 32.4 2.7 0.5 1.4 29.2 3.3 1.2 2.9 36.5 2.6 0.6 1.0
Four-Year Elite 10.7 0.5 0.5 −1.0 14.4 0.5 0.4 −1.5 4.9 0.3 0.2 −0.6
High-Income
No college 23.6 −4.3 0.5 −1.6 22.6 −4.2 0.3 −2.7 25.8 −3.9 0.4 −0.3
Community College 18.6 0.0 −0.8 1.3 19.0 0.3 −0.8 2.4 18.0 −0.5 −0.9 −0.7
Four-Year Non-Elite 42.0 4.7 0.6 2.2 38.0 4.4 0.3 2.9 49.5 4.5 0.7 1.4
Four-Year Elite 15.8 −0.4 −0.2 −1.9 20.5 −0.4 0.1 −2.6 6.7 −0.1 −0.2 −0.4
NOTE: Policy (1) increases unsubsidized loan limits by $4,000, policy (2) increases the maximum Pell grant
by $4,000, and policy (3) makes community college and in-state public non-elite institutions free to attend.
The baseline columns (B) show share of all students of that group that do not enroll in college or enroll at
various college types. Columns for policy simulations (1), (2), and (3) show the percentage point change
from the baseline. An unobserved type 2 student has stronger preferences for college enrollment, is more
likely to receive admissions and aid from all colleges, and enjoys higher labor market returns.
7.5 Welfare Implications
In addition to evaluating changes in enrollment and college choice under different policy scenarios,
a consideration of the resulting welfare effects of each policy helps us understand exactly which
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students are better off and by how much. Specifically, I focus on welfare after the student leaves
college – recall that in the model, once the student is on the labor market, she inelastically provides
labor and smooths consumption over her working life. Furthermore, as consumption is a function
of accumulated student debt in addition to wage gains, the welfare analysis accounts for the net
gains to borrowing. I measure the welfare gain as the corresponding amount of annual transfer to
the student that would result in the same lifetime utility gain or loss as the policy simulation. As
shown in Table 7.2, welfare gains differ greatly by policy and student characteristics.
A free public college provides the greatest post-college welfare gain, equivalent to an annual
$342 transfer for the average student. However, this policy is by far the most expensive among
others I evaluate – depending on the year, the cost of the policy ranges from $15,030 to $18,598 per
student. On the other hand, the cost of raising subsidized and unsubsidized loan limits are $746
per borrower, as measured by the subsidy rates of each loan type calculated by the Congressional
Budget Office. For a significantly lower cost, relaxing subsidized loan limits provides 50 percent of
the welfare gain as a free public college education to the average student.
Note that welfare gains from all policies are concentrated among higher ability (type 2) students.
For example, type 2 students from low- and middle-income families enjoy 94 to 113 percent of
the welfare gains they would have received from a full subsidy at public college. Furthermore, a
unique result shows that relaxing loan limits are equally beneficial for high ability students from
both low-income and high-income families. However, expanding access to loans does present the
risk of inducing low ability students to enter college enrollment and consequently experience the
lowest welfare gains of any policies due to accumulated student debt.
7.6 Effects of Supply Side Responses
College pricing may respond to financial aid programs, as hypothesized by former U.S. Secretary
of Education William Bennett. Lucca et al. (2019) estimate that increasing the subsidized loan
limit by a dollar passes through to a 56 to 76 cent increase in tuition, depending on the institution
type. Increasing unsubsidized loan limits results in lower pass through of up to 22 cents per
54









PE GE PE GE
Overall 71 (29) 342 (29) 142 (29) 135 (31) 171 (29) 137 (28)
Low-Income
Overall 127 (58) 410 (57) 137 (64) 131 (55) 169 (61) 119 (61)
Type 1 48 (35) 227 (36) 25 (36) 24 (34) 44 (35) 26 (36)
Type 2 539 (175) 995 (187) 875 (194) 813 (185) 939 (171) 713 (196)
Middle-Income
Overall 96 (46) 361 (48) 134 (42) 120 (45) 161 (49) 120 (46)
Type 1 38 (30) 202 (30) 15 (27) 10 (29) 35 (31) 21 (27)
Type 2 396 (162) 836 (166) 902 (160) 832 (153) 949 (155) 726 (170)
High-Income
Overall 4 (54) 270 (53) 154 (54) 152 (55) 181 (53) 167 (55)
Type 1 −1 (33) 188 (31) 36 (33) 37 (33) 53 (34) 47 (32)
Type 2 44 (180) 329 (178) 932 (164) 899 (177) 979 (193) 907 (200)
NOTE: Welfare gains are measured as annual monetary transfers given to individuals in the labor market
with equal marginal utility as the outcomes of each policy simulation. Pell grants increases the maximum
grant awarded by $4,000. Relaxing unsubsidized loans lifts the unsubsidized limit by $4,000 and relaxing
subsidized loans lifts the subsidized limit by $2,911 (a revenue neutral amount). Partial equilibrium analysis
(PE) holds tuition fixed, while account for college pricing responses (GE) changes tuition by amounts
estimated in Lucca et al. (2019). Standard errors provided in parentheses.
dollar. I use these estimates as given amounts of tuition pass-through for Stafford loans. Then,
I evaluate increases in the limit for subsidized and unsubsidized loans assuming college tuition
shifts simultaneously according to these pass-through amounts. This analysis provides a back-of-
the-envelope pass through effect of financial aid on college choice. That is, I am able to provide
an effect of relaxing credit constraints on student welfare while accounting for the equilibrium
effects a federal policy may induce, rather than focusing on a partial equilibrium that is analogous
to randomly extending the policy to a small subset of students.
As shown in the “GE” columns of Table 7.2, accounting for college pricing responses sub-
stantially reduces welfare gains from relaxing borrowing limits. Increasing subsidized limits show
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the largest effects, as they exhibit the highest amount of tuition pass-through – this pass-through
of a $2,911 increase to subsidized loan limits reduces the average welfare gains from the limit
increase by 20 percent. Furthermore, reductions of welfare gains are most pronounced for low-
and middle-income students of all abilities, ranging from 26 to 30 percent. This heterogeneous




Although federal student loans are the largest form of undergraduate financial aid by volume,
we know surprisingly little about the impact of an expansion in loans on a student’s postsecondary
human capital investments. This dissertation furthers our understanding of the different economic
mechanisms presented by student loan policies and price reductions in a student’s college enrollment
behavior. Specifically, I develop a model of a student’s decision-making with regard to college
enrollment, choice of institution, borrowing, and part-time labor in the presence of borrowing
constraints. I use data on two recent high-school graduating cohorts who straddle a rare increase in
federal borrowing limits to estimate the structural parameters of the dynamic discrete choice model.
The empirical analysis shows that relaxing borrowing constraints increases overall enrollment
and shifts enrollment towards four-year non-elite institutions. Additionally, higher loan limits
lead to greater persistence as shown by higher levels of enrollment in the second and third years.
Expanding targeted education subsidies through federal Pell grants lead to greater community
college enrollment among low-income students. While free public college improves enrollment,
sorting between community colleges and four-year colleges by income may not reduce existing gaps
in the quality of colleges selected. Importantly, relaxing subsidized loan limits provides 50 percent
of the average student’s welfare gain from the free public college option at a significantly lower
cost, and equally improves welfare for high ability students from all levels of household income.
Results from this research add to a growing consensus that credit constraints are more relevant
to students’ decision-making in recent years than in the 1980s. Due to infrequent changes to the
loan environment, evaluation of federal policies has been difficult. However, this dissertation is
among the first to use variation from the loan limit increases of 2007 and 2008 and nationally
representative student level data to estimate the effect of relaxing borrowing constraints on students’
postsecondary human capital investments.
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As more recent studies find that loans play a role in human capital accumulation, promising
future research could explore additional margins of human capital investments, such as major choice
and degree completion. Furthermore, future research can focus on understanding endogenous
decision-making of other agents in the market for education, such as institutions and governments.
Accounting for colleges’ pricing responses to increased availability of aid, measured by existing
estimates, imply a reduction of average welfare gains by 20 percent and a reduction of low- and
middle-income students’ welfare gains by up to 30 percent. I explore such equilibrium effects of
student loan policies in the presence of endogenous college admissions and pricing in Appendix
D. Continued research in this area will offer insight on the effectiveness of policies at improving
student outcomes without potentially increasing the already high costs of higher education.
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APPENDIX A: DATA AVAILABILITY, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND SAMPLE
SELECTION
A.1 Example of Federal Loan Eligibility
Consider the example of a dependent freshman student in 2008, whose college bill totals $10,000
after receiving scholarships and grants – her cost of attendance τijt. The FAFSA determines here
EFC to be $6,000. Since her financial need of $4,000 is greater than the federal limit on subsidized
Stafford loans in 2008, she is able to borrow $3,500 of subsidized loans. Assuming she does, she
can now borrow an additional $2,000 in unsubsidized loans, which is the remainder of the total
borrowing limit of $5,500, because her remaining cost of attendance after scholarships, grants, and
subsidized loans of $6,500 is still greater than the total borrowing limit. With a total of $5,500
borrowed, the student and her family owe the college $4,500. At this point, the family may pay
that amount with a combination of out-of-pocket expense or through higher interest PLUS loans.1
If her parents are denied a PLUS loan, the student is considered independent, and can borrow
unsubsidized loans to finance the remaining $4,500 owed. Since she has borrowed up to her full
$10,000 cost of attendance, she is not able to borrow up to the federal limit of $11,500. If her family
is approved for a PLUS loan, but refuses to pay or take out the loan on her behalf, the student is still
considered dependent and she will need to borrow from the private market at a higher interest rate
by demonstrating her credit worthiness.
A.2 Sample Selection
The reduction in size from the survey sample to the analysis sample is primarily due to survey
attrition and the availability of transcript data. I exclude those students who do not complete a
high school credential. I classify a student as eligible to enter college for the first time in a specific
1Parents of students are eligible to borrow unsubsidized PLUS loans, which have higher interest rates (7–9%)
and fees, and are limited by the COA less any other federal loans borrowed. While parents are contractually
responsible for the repayment of the loan, students may often have informal agreements to repay these
loans. Only 4.2% of students’ parents borrow PLUS loans in 2004 (3.2% in 2013), borrowing an average of
$12,810 ($16,052 in 2013).
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academic year if she receives her high school credential in the prior academic year. Furthermore, I
exclude students who directly enter graduate school a year after finishing undergraduate education
and those that transfer colleges. In future versions of the model, I will reintroduce the transfer
students by incorporating a reduced form transfer probability between community colleges and
public institutions – the most commonly observed transfer behavior.
A.3 Data Availability in Select Years
While I have data for a longer horizon for the Class of 2004, I analyze enrollment, part-time labor,
and borrowing behavior for the first three years. The administrative data on FAFSA is not reported
in 2007 and 2008, which does not allow me to solve the model in the fourth and fifth years of
college enrollment for the Class of 2004. Furthermore, part-time labor data is not available past the
student’s third year in college. One benefit of this restriction is that the Great Recession of 2008
does not directly affect my estimation because the first three years of enrollment (2004 to 2006) are
unlikely to be altered by a future recession. While the Class of 2004 was undoubtedly affected in
the labor market due to the recession, estimates of wage premiums rely on labor market data that
covers the years 2004 to 2006, 2011, and 2012, which mitigate concerns over identification of the
college wage premiums.
A.4 Individual Cost of Attendance
The student’s cost of attendance τjt at college j in academic year t relies on the posted tuition τ̄jt
and any institutional aid offered to the student. The data offers coarse level of detail regarding the
amount of tuition that was covered by scholarships and aid at the student’s enrolled institution,
ranging from none to less than half, more than half (but not all), and all. During the application
stage, the aid outcomes signify whether the student is offered aid, but not the amount. For these
cases, I use the IPEDS data on average amount of aid offered by each institution, conditional on any
aid offer. I consider all sources of nonfederal aid, including state and institutional, in construction
the cost of attendance.
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A.5 Class of 2013 Applications
Data on the class of 2013 only provides the first three student applications. However, I can also
see the actual number of applications. Given this information, I compare class of 2013 students
to class of 2004 students who also applied to the same number of schools. Conditional on the
number of applications, the distribution of these applications across college types is remarkably
similar. Therefore, I fill in the additional applications using a flexible logistic estimator that
predicts the probability of applying to a specific type of college conditional on the total number
of applications the student sends. I add two selective colleges in for those students whose three
observed applications include a community college, and one selective college and one community
college for those students whose observed applications do not include a community college. If a
student has already applied for the same type of college as a newly imputed application, I assume
she is admitted similarly. If a student has no observed applications to the same type of college as
the newly imputed applications, I assume she is rejected.
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APPENDIX B: COMPLETE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
B.1 Expected Family Contribution in Initial Period
This specification of EFC follows from a legally defined formula that considers the household’s
finances, the potential for the household to pay for other children’s college expenditures, and
changes over time to the formula. Importantly, EFC is not a function of ability. Furthermore, after
expected family contribution is calculated, it is bound below at zero. Therefore, I model the latent
expected family contribution, assuming εE ∼ N (0, σ2E).
EFC∗1 = α




EFC1 = 1 [EFC
∗
1 > 0] · EFC∗1
B.2 Financial Need and Cost of Attendance
Recall that financial need is constructed as
Njt = τjt − EFCt − Pellt.
The stochastic process below of latent future financial need N∗jt assumes that εNt ∼ N (0, σ2N)
and that observed financial need Njt censors the latent variable to be nonnegative.
N∗jt =
(
















This specification of financial need highlights that the student’s cost of attendance τjt is a
function of the posted sticker price τ jt and factors that determine the amount of aid she may receive
from the institution. The terms αN and αNj account for the average discount students receive at in-
stitution j, while αNX1 captures discounts received by individual heterogeneity, including the amount
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of aid the student received in their first year of enrollment and the student’s cohort. The vector Xt
includes demographic characteristics and variables that influence expected family contribution, such
as household income and the number of siblings. Lastly ZPellt represent exogenously determined
maximum Pell grant award amounts that vary annually.
Given this stochastic process, I assume that future financial need falls in discrete bin n if
Njt+1 ∈ [Nn−1, Nn), where N0 = 0. This discretization simplifies calculation of the future




























| (1, d, l) , Njt+1
]
· PN (Njt+1 ∈ [Nn−1, Nn)) .
The remaining expectation is taken over future preference shocks. Because I model these shocks as
Type I Extreme Value, the expectation has a closed form.
For a FAFSA non-filing student in college in t > 1, her annual price pjt is a function of
stochastic cost of attendance τjt, which I model as
τjt =
(




τ jt + α
τ
X2Xt + ετt (B.2)
This specification highlights that students receive various levels of price discounts from the sticker
price, depending on the attended institution j and individual heterogeneity, including the amount of
aid the student received aid in their first year of enrollment, the student’s year in college, and the
student’s cohort. The vector Xt includes demographic characteristics. I assume that ετt ∼ N (0, σ2τ ).
Similar to financial need, I assume that future cost of attendance falls into discrete bin n if
τjt+1 ∈ [τn−1, τn), where τ0 = 0. For a student who does not file the FAFSA, her future expected
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
C.1 Price Function
The price function measures the amount the student herself is responsible to pay for college, using
part-time labor income and borrowed funds. The price function parameters for FAFSA filers measure
the price adjustment relative to their government stated financial need. That is a low-income student
of type 1 is responsible to pay $16,020 less than her financial need, as shown in Table C.1. The
parameters for middle- and high-income show additional price reductions for FAFSA filers by
household income. A high-income student is responsible to pay $20,795 less than her financial need.
All terms for FAFSA filers are negative, suggesting that the student is receiving help, that is, FAFSA
filing parents are helping their students and the price students are responsible for is reducing.
The price function parameters for non-filers are relative to the cost of attendance. We see that
the level of parental support varies greatly by income and unobserved ability. A high-income type
1 student is responsible for $11,564 less than her cost of attendance, while a low-income type 1
student is responsible for $5,469 more than her cost of attendance.
Table C.1: Price Function Parameters
Price ($1,000s) FAFSA Filers FAFSA Non-Filers
Low Income −16.020 5.469
Middle Income −18.143 −6.122
High Income −20.795 −11.564
Type 2 7.001 7.251
NOTE: Future version will provide bootstrapped standard errors.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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C.2 Financial Need, Cost of Attendance, and Expected Family Contribution
A key component of the price function is financial need for FAFSA filers and cost of attendance for
non-filers. Therefore, students must account for future shocks to both of these stochastic processes.
Table C.2 shows parameter estimates for the stochastic processes of financial need and cost of
attendance in years t = 2, . . . , t′. The coefficients on posted tuition and interactions show expected
patterns of institutional aid in future years. Specifically, a student who receives aid in her first
year can expect to receive 83 to 96 percent of that aid in subsequent years. For FAFSA filers, the
parameters also show that higher income families exhibit lower financial need, while families with
multiple children face higher financial need.
Table C.3 shows the stochastic process for initial period expected family contribution. As
expected, EFC increases with income and decreases with the presence of multiple siblings.
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Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E.)
Posted Tuition 1.031 (0.036) 0.982 (0.016)
× Aid Discount in t = 1 −0.835 (0.010) −0.957 (0.004)
× In-state Public Non-elite −0.116 (0.016) −0.002 (0.006)
× Out-of-state Public Non-elite −0.150 (0.023) −0.003 (0.008)
× In-state Private Non-elite −0.079 (0.023) 0.018 (0.009)
× Out-of-state Private Non-elite −0.108 (0.024) 0.016 (0.009)
× In-state Public Elite −0.147 (0.020) −0.004 (0.007)
× Out-of-state Public Elite −0.177 (0.026) −0.013 (0.009)
× Private Elite −0.222 (0.029) 0.002 (0.010)
Middle Income −1.129 (0.176) 0.004 (0.009)
High Income −7.341 (0.190) −0.073 (0.052)
One Sibling 0.034 (0.051)
Multiple Siblings 1.446 (0.152)
Maximum Pell Grant −0.003 (0.002)
Constant 8.504 (7.589) 0.299 (0.248)
Type 2 −1.235 (0.138) 0.200 (0.047)
σ 8.033 (0.055) 1.862 (0.017)
Observations 12, 000 6, 530
NOTE: Estimation includes controls that are not presented in this table: gender, race, and the student’s cohort
and year in college in levels and interactions with posted tuition. Future version will provide bootstrapped
standard errors. All unweighted sample sizes are rounded to nearest ten according to IES restricted-use data
guidelines.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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Table C.3: Expected Family Contribution in t = 1 ($1,000s)
Tobit
Coefficient (S.E.)
Class of 2013 −4.708 (0.483)
Middle Income 12.382 (0.612)
High Income 31.232 (0.619)
One Sibling 0.340 (0.673)




NOTE: Coefficients for the college type (rows) interacted with student characteristics (columns). Future
version will provide bootstrapped standard errors. All unweighted sample sizes are rounded to nearest ten
according to IES restricted-use data guidelines.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Longitudinal
Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09), and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
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APPENDIX D: EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF STUDENT LOANS IN THE U.S.
COLLEGE MARKET
As shown in section 7.6, accounting for college pricing responses to federal policies can reduce
welfare gains for students. Failure to understand behavior on both sides of the higher education
market may lead to ineffective and costly policies meant to improve student outcomes. Colleges may
increase tuition in response to an expansion in student loans because they anticipate that students
who wish to enroll are willing to pay a higher tuition by borrowing, or may tighten admission
because they receive more applications. If a loan expansion does induce a rise in tuition, then the
eventual cost to the student could change very little, resulting in a weaker improvement in student
welfare than expected. Dubbed the Bennett hypothesis after former U.S. Secretary of Education
William Bennett, the pass-through of financial aid to higher college tuition has mixed empirical
support in the cases of grants, state scholarships, and tax credits. Specific to the context of student
loans, Lucca et al. (2019) estimate that the most recent loan expansion, in the 2007-2008 and
2008-2009 academic years, results in tuition increases of up to 76 cents for every additional dollar
available to students from increased loan limits. Therefore, analysis of large scale policies aimed at
helping students afford college should further consider how a simultaneous response from colleges
may mitigate improvements to student outcomes.
To capture the above mechanisms of the U.S. higher education market, I complement the
previously described analysis of student behaviors with a model of college admissions, institutional
aid, and tuition. Colleges compete with each other for students and form beliefs of student demand
in order to construct a desirable student body while balancing revenue from tuition, state and federal
governments, and private sources with educational and operational costs.
A combination of models that consider simultaneous student and college behaviors can be used
to identify education subsidies that are most effective at increasing higher education accessibility
and at moderating tuition growth. Implications of subsidies to students differ from that of subsidies
to colleges. The subsidies that target the student relax her budget or borrowing constraint, and
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generally improve welfare for those with financial need.1 However, if financial aid passes through
to tuition, these policies may induce tuition growth and, consequently, harm all students. Subsidies
shifting government dollars to institutions instead may relax colleges’ budget constraints, which
could reduce tuition or increase education investments that improve student outcomes, such as
completion rates and college quality2 (Deming and Walters, 2017). Lower tuition has the potential
to benefit all students, whereas expanded financial aid may help a narrower set of students with
financial need and potentially harm all students if such policies also induce tuition growth.
In the rest of this appendix, section D.1 reviews the relevant literature and section D.2 describes
a model of college decisions. As estimation of this complicated equilibrium model is difficult in
nature, results will be reported in subsequent papers conducted post-graduation. However, section
D.3 discusses an estimation strategy for future empirical analysis.
D.1 Related Literature
This research contributes to a growing literature at the intersection of economics and higher
education that considers two central mechanisms affecting a student and her familys ability to afford
college: the students enrollment response to financial aid and college pricing behavior. While a
majority of analyses in this area focus on one side of the market in partial equilibrium, assuming
other market factors remain fixed, select recent work has used general equilibrium analysis to
consider student and college behaviors simultaneously.
One explanation for the commonly observed muted enrollment response to increased availability
of loans, in comparison to grants, could be the borrowing trade-off between enrollment at a more
expensive, and possibly higher quality, college today with future repayment of debt. College pricing
1Examples of such policies include increasing federal borrowing limits or lowering interest rates, proposals
to completely subsidize public colleges, and a trend among elite colleges to replace loans altogether with
grants and institutional scholarships for students with financial need. On the other hand, as discussed in
the U.S. federal budget proposal for 2020, an example of aid reduction for students is the elimination of
subsidized student loans, in which the federal government subsidizes accrued interest during enrollment.
2Several studies use student investments as a measure of college quality and document the high labor market
returns to college quality (Black and Smith, 2004, 2006; Long, 2008; Dillon and Smith, 2017, 2020).
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responses to financial aid programs offers another explanation. Several attempts to understand this
relationship by empirically testing the Bennett hypothesis have yielded mixed results that vary by the
type of institution and the type of federal aid. Studies focused on the effect of Pell grants estimate
that every additional dollar of aid passes through to a zero to 50 cents increase in tuition, depending
on the institution’s control (public or private) and the student’s location (in-state or out-of-state).3
Similarly, analysis of state grants and education tax credits find a response in college pricing, with
slightly lower pass-through rates of 30 percent (Long, 2004a,b). The pass-through associated
with student loans appears to be higher than that of grants as Lucca et al. (2019) and Cellini and
Goldin (2014) both find support for the Bennett hypothesis, with the latter study estimating that
federal aid-eligible for-profit institutions charge tuition that is roughly 78 percent higher than their
non-eligible for-profit counterparts.
Gillen (2012) reconciles the different amounts of pass-through for grants and loans with a
refined hypothesis that emphasizes two mechanisms central to my model. First, the type of aid –
more precisely the size and segment of the student population affected by the aid – can determine the
size of the tuition increase. Therefore, unsubsidized federal loans that are available to potentially any
student would have a different effect than grant programs that target low-income students. Second,
the institutions ability to set tuition varies greatly as some public colleges face state level tuition
caps while other private colleges use institutional aid to freely price discriminate. Not considering
these differences across institutions would lead to incorrect interpretation of the empirical role of
federal aid on tuition.
The model presented in this appendix most closely relates to equilibrium analyses of financial
aid in the market for higher education. Epple et al. (2006) estimate a model of private colleges
and students with financial aid, while Epple et al. (2017) calibrate a similar model including both
public and private colleges. Fu (2014) estimates a multi-stage model to include the application-
admissions game between students and colleges, students enrollment decisions, and tuition setting
3See McPherson and Schapiro (1999); Singell and Stone (2003); Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004). Most recently,
Turner (2017) estimates that colleges capture 11 to 20 cents per dollar of Pell grant aid, primarily through
institutional aid as a lever of price discrimination.
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behavior of both public and private colleges. These studies highlight heterogeneity in market power
demonstrated through more flexible responses by elite private colleges to policies that subsidize
students.4 However, each of these models considers financial to be grants and scholarships.
Therefore, I contribute to this literature by incorporating student loans in order to account for
the borrowing trade-off and the different implications for tuition pass-through. Gordon and Hedlund
(2017, 2018) also include the borrowing trade-off, but focus on explaining the rise in college tuition.
I address a complementary research question that focuses on student welfare, to which higher tuition
is one contributory factor. I also use student-level data to estimate a richer empirical specification of
students application, enrollment, and borrowing decisions. Importantly, students in my model differ
by unobserved ability that impacts several outcomes, including future earnings. This inclusion
allows me to address identification concerns arising from ability bias and match nuances in the data,
such as a realistic college admissions process that considers measures of student ability unobserved
to researchers beyond test scores.
D.2 Model of College Decisions
A dynamic discrete choice model outlined in chapter 3 describes the decision-making process of
consumers (potential students) in the higher education market – high school graduating students
decide to apply to college, enroll on an annual basis, and determine a method to finance education.
On the supply side of the higher education market, colleges make static annual decisions to set
tuition, and admission and aid policies.
The universe of heterogeneous colleges K include k institutions, each of a type j. A college’s
type reflects its level (two-year vs. four-year), control (private vs. public), national rankings (elite
or non-elite), and location relative to the student (in- or out-of-state). The type j determines the
institution’s objective function, constraints, and choice set. Specifically, I assume community
colleges do not make any decisions – their tuition is constrained by state policies and admission is
4Additional equilibrium analysis of higher education has considered college major provision (Cook, 2020),
distributional impacts of race-blind affirmative action policies (Kapor, 2020), and colleges’ pricing behavior
and resource allocation in response to information available through the FAFSA (Fillmore, 2020).
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not selective. All public colleges’ tuition is determined by state policies; however, these institutions
decide admissions and aid policies to maximize their objective functions. Lastly, private colleges
set tuition and decide admissions and aid policies.
D.2.1 Timing and Information Set
Relative to the student’s decision-making timeline (Figure 3.1), colleges act at two stages – before
students apply and before students enroll. Colleges also make decisions simultaneously with
competing colleges. Therefore, colleges use available observed information and knowledge of
students’ and other institutions’ decision rules to form expectations of other agents’ behaviors.
Conversely, a student does not know a college’s optimal decision rules; rather, she forms reduced
form expectations of the uncertainty of college admission and aid.
Before the end of the student’s last year in high school, t = 0, all colleges simultaneously
announce cost of attendance τ k1 for the academic year t = 1. Recall this sticker price is the
maximum any student will pay to attend college k. Once students make application decisions, a
college’s admissions office observes the student’s high school academic achievement ai and ability
µi. Furthermore, the college’s aid office also observes the student’s expected family contribution
EFCi. The assumption that the admissions office does not view the student’s EFC is motivated
by need blind admissions policies. Based on this information, each college receiving a student’s
application jointly offers (i) admission and (ii) institutional aid that determines the student’s
individual cost of attendance τik1.
Particularly important to the college’s optimization problem are students’ and peer institutions’
decision rules. First, I assume that colleges know the student’s optimal decisions: δj0 maps the
student’s information set prior to applications at t = 0 to her optimal application decision for college
j, while δj1 maps her information set at t = 1, after admissions and aid decisions, to her optimal
enrollment e∗j1 at college j in t = 1.
δj0 : (X,µ,Ω0)→ 1 [j ∈ A∗] δj1 : (X,µ,Ω1)→ e∗j1.
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Between the application stage (t = 0) and the enrollment stage (t = 1), the student’s information
set Ω updates to include college admission and aid offers that determine her individual cost of
attendance. Second, I assume a symmetric equilibrium where colleges of the same type share a
common optimal decision rule. Therefore, heterogeneity in college characteristics and student
demand drives heterogeneity in outcomes. As each stage of the college decision making process
relies on expectations of their own future behavior and other colleges’ actions, I describe the model
in reverse chronological order.
D.2.2 College Objectives
A college of type j maximizes a function of average enrolled student ability θj and high-school
achievement Aj , as well as net revenue Rj . Each college chooses an admissions rule ρij and an
individual student cost of attendance τij for a student of type i.
max
ρij ,τij
νj(θj, Aj) + λjRj.
The average ability and high-school achievement of enrolled students and net revenue are
defined as following. The term πij is the share of college j applicants that are of student type i,
differentiated by their ability µi, high-school achievement ai, and expected family contribution
EFCi. The college may also receive exogenous revenue Yj per student from outside sources













πijρij E(δij1|ρij, ρim, τij, τim)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (i enrolls at j)
(τij + Yj − Cj)
74
Note that student body characteristics depend crucially on which students enroll. Therefore, colleges
form expectations over student enrollment decisions δij1, conditional on their potential admissions
and cost of attendance at other institutions m. While college j does not see student i’s application or
admissions profile, they do know the student application and enrollment decision rules δij0 and δij1,
and the decision rules of other college’s acceptance (ρim) of and prices charged (τim) to student i.
College j uses this information to calculate the probability of student i enrolling at their institution.
The college faces an exogenous enrollment target kj that effectively operates as a capacity constraint
(D.2). ∑
i
πijρijE(δij1|ρij, ρim, τij, τim) ≤ kj (D.2)
Lastly, public college cost of attendance is bound by an exogenous in-state and out-of-state cost of
attendance τ̄j set at the state level, such that
τij ≤ τ̄j ∀ Public institutions j (D.3)
I drop the conditioning variables (ρij, ρim, τij, τim) to reduce notation; however, this information
remains in college j’s information set.
I assume that νj is concave and monotonically increasing in ability θj and academic achievement
Aj of the campus’ incoming class.5 I interpret this objective function as a college’s desire to
maximize short-term and long-term payoffs. In the short-run, colleges may look to attract high-
achieving students with good grades and test scores in order to boost their rankings, which are
functions of these high-school academic measures. In the long-run, however, colleges may care
more about a student’s ability, which can be productive on the labor market and potentially lead to a
future stream of donations. Furthermore, colleges operate as non-profit organizations. Therefore,
5Several studies consider νj to be the college’s quality, which is improved by attracting high-ability students
(Epple et al., 2006, 2017; Gordon and Hedlund, 2017, 2018). I do not assume that colleges look to maximize
quality; rather, I use college type as an exogenous characteristic similar to Fu (2014), who assumes colleges
maximize a weighted average of student ability and tuition revenues. The general functional assumptions
and inputs, however, are consistent with the literature’s various models of college objectives as static and
monotonically increasing in student ability.
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I assume that the institution reinvests the net revenue generated from undergraduate students in
other divisions of the college, such as faculty and graduate student research in the short-run and
campus renovations in the long-run. While I do not factor in the realization of future benefits to
the college, the objective function captures the effect of current decision on expectations of future
payoffs without the need to solve a dynamic college problem.
D.2.3 Admission Rule
Solving the college’s problem yields the indifference condition below that the admissions office











+ Cj − Yj︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC
The indifference condition equates the expected marginal benefit with the marginal cost of admitting
a student of type i. As the admissions office only observes student ability µi and academic
achievement ai, they must form expectations of the marginal benefit the student provides to the
institution. Specifically, the student can improve the average ability and achievement and also
generate revenue, which the admissions office must predict to account for scholarships form the aid
office.6 The marginal cost of admitting student i is the net expense (Cj − Yj) and the opportunity
cost of giving up a capacity constrained seat, represented by the multiplier λk if the constraint binds.
The admissions office then simply accepts students who have greater expected marginal benefits
than marginal costs, randomly accepts students on the margin with probability ρ, and rejects all
others:
ρ∗ij = 1[E(MB|µi, ai) > MC] + ρ · 1[E(MB|µi, ai) = MC]
Two factors allow elite schools to set tight admissions standards. First, elite schools applications
will be composed of more students from the higher end of the ability and achievement distributions
6In this notation, νjθ ≡
∂νj
∂θj
and νjA ≡ ∂νj∂Aj .
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and they may also receive more applications overall because of the wage premium shown in (4.3).
Therefore, their capacity constraint is more likely to bind (λk > 0). Furthermore, a student on the
margin of an institution’s binding capacity constraint will be penalized more at an elite institution
than at a non-elite institution because the opportunity cost of admitting her is admitting an average
student, who will be of higher ability and achievement at the elite institution. Second, as νj is
concave in θj , the marginal benefit of a high ability student is diminishing in ability. Therefore, the
elite school sets higher standards as it is less impressed by a high ability student than a non-elite
school.
D.2.4 Individual Student Cost of Attendance
The aid office faces a similar indifference condition as it determines the price to charge each














Here, we notice multiple mechanisms that affect the student’s cost of attendance and likelihood
of receiving aid (τ ∗ij < τ̄j). First, cost of attendance is decreasing in student ability µi and
achievement ai, which is rationalizes colleges offering merit scholarships. Second, colleges with
larger outside sources of revenue Yj charge lower prices. Third, marginally admitted students, for
whom the college’s capacity constraint binds (λk > 0), are likely to face higher prices. Lastly,
the student’s likelihood of enrollment and price sensitivity play a critical role. As students are
more likely to enroll in response to lower prices (∂E(δij)/∂τ ∗ij < 0), colleges will reduce prices if
they think they can entice a desirable student to enroll. This further rationalizes need-based aid as
students who have low expected family contributions are more likely to respond to a college’s price
reduction by enrolling.
As student enrollment decisions are a function of other college’s optimal decisions (ρ∗im, τ
∗
im),
college j’s decision depend on college m’s behavior. Similarly, college m’s behavior is also a
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function of college j’s behavior. These colleges do not observe each other’s decisions as they act
simultaneously, but they do know the decision rules as part of a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore
(ρ∗ik, τ
∗
ik)∀k∈K is a fixed point solution of colleges’ optimization problem.
D.2.5 Advertised Cost of Attendance
Before period t = 0, all colleges simultaneously announce a cost of attendance τ̄j that serves as the
maximum price. However, I assume that private and public colleges systematically differ in setting
the sticker price.
Private colleges Private college j determines the sticker price τ̄j as the highest price they anticipate
that their aid office will charge once applications are revealed. Therefore, the advertised cost of
attendance is a function of the distribution of ability, achievement, and EFC that will determine
future applications and the knowledge of competing colleges m’s decision rules.
τ̄j = E[max τij|δj0, Fµ, Fa, FEFC , τ̄m]
Private colleges set prices for two broad reasons. First, they try to maximize net revenue and
may raise the sticker price to cover declining outside funding Yj or increasing costs Cj . Second,
colleges try to predict the applications they receive in response to a specific cost of attendance, such
that they can admit the highest ability students. Therefore, the student’s application decision rule δj0
plays a key role for each college’s decision. Elite private colleges set higher prices as a screening
tool. These colleges know that high ability students will attend, even at a higher cost, because of
the wage premium. The availability of student loans allows colleges greater room to increase the
sticker price, without the fear of reduced enrollment. These institutions may also compete against
peer institutions that admit the same high ability students; this competition prevents a college from
excessively increasing its price. The model then predicts that institutions of the same type should
set similar cost of attendance, while across type cost of attendance differences should be larger.
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Public colleges I assume that a state s’s government mandates price caps or growth rates that
constrain its public universities to set current cost of attendance based on past cost of attendance.7
Therefore, I model their sticker price setting behavior as a function of lagged sticker price and
growth rate:
log τ̄jt = β1 log τ̄jt−1 + gjst + εjt.
Here gjst may be an explicitly stated price cap as compiled for some states in Deming and Walters
(2017), or an implicit function of several university- and state-specific characteristics, such as tax
revenue, political affiliation, or local economic conditions.
D.3 Estimation Strategy
Estimation of the structural parameters will follow a three-step procedure. The first step estimates
the student model of application, enrollment, college choice, and student loan borrowing as detailed
in chapter 5. Given these estimates, I will simulate multiple cohorts of high school seniors. Colleges
then receive applications from these simulated cohorts based on the optimal student decision rules
and determine admission and individual cost of attendance.
In the second step, I will estimate the college objective function parameters Θν . Conditional
on estimated student side parameters Θ̂S , the college solves its admission and aid decisions and
yields several model moments, including the probability of admission ρj(µi, ai) and individual cost
of attendance τj(EFCi, µi, ai). I will use the generalized method of moments (GMM) to match
these model moments to moments from the simulated population of student applications. The
population counterpart to the model outputs would include admissions probabilities P̂j(µ, a) and
the probability of receiving aid P̂Aj (EFC, a, µ), estimated in the student model and reported in
chapter 6. One concern with such a model is the presence of multiple equilibria, but estimation of
7Deming and Walters (2017) document explicit state mandates. Rejection of this assumption implies that
public universities set low prices (as observed in data) to increase student enrollment, in hopes of raising net
revenue.
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average rates of admission P̂j and institutional aid P̂Aj identifies the equilibrium in the data, rather
than imposing an equilibrium selection rule.
In the third step, I will estimate the college tuition function and cost parameters by matching
model tuition to observed tuition. Solution to the college problem provides the optimal advertised
cost of attendance, τ̄ ∗j . As in the previous step, I will use GMM to estimate optimal advertised cost
of attendance and parameters of the college expenses to match observed data on advertised cost of
attendance τ̄j .
Identification of College Parameters Identification of college parameters Θν relies on the fol-
lowing plausibly exogenous variation and assumptions. First, colleges take external funding Yj as
exogenous; examples include state and federal funding received by colleges. Second, Deming and
Walters (2017) highlight the presence of price caps for public universities: some states set a percent-
age cap on public university tuition growth, such that it may not exceed a particular amount. Such
data present exogenous policies that could identify public university tuition functions. Furthermore,
these price caps and lagged public university tuitions could also identify these institutions’ marginal
effect on competing private universities of similar types.
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